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Eastern India is home to 88 million, or nearly a
third of India’s rural poor. Although its industrial
economy has stagnated, the region offers vast
scope for accelerated development of irrigated
agriculture based especially on groundwater wells.
While much of South Asia suffers from acute
overexploitation of groundwater resources,
eastern India has over one-fourth of India’s
usable groundwater resources; and less than one-
fifth of it is developed. Stimulating groundwater
development in the region is not only central to
creating livelihoods and welfare for its poor but
also to addressing its syndrome of extensive
waterlogging and flood-proneness.
This report analyzes how public policies
designed to promote groundwater development
over the past 50 years have failed in their
promise, and how initiative by private agents can
generate the social welfare the region needs so
direly. The report outlines a five-pronged strategy
for attacking eastern India’s rural poverty through
fuller utilization of its groundwater resources.
First, eastern India needs to scrap its existing
minor irrigation programs run by government
bureaucracies, which gobble up funds but deliver
little irrigation. Second, while the electricity-supply
environment is in total disarray, innovative ideas—
such as decentralized retailing and metering of
power and prepaid electricity cards—need to be
piloted as part of a broader initiative to improve
the quality of power supply to agriculture. Third,
programs are needed to improve the unacceptably
low energy-efficiency of electric as well as diesel
pumps. Fourth, there is a need to promote diesel
pumps under 5-hp and improved manual irrigation
technologies such as treadle pumps. Finally,
above all else, east Indian States need to reform
their pump subsidy schemes à la Uttar Pradesh
(UP) so as to ameliorate the scarcity of pump
capital that lies at the heart of the problem.vi1
Wells and Welfare in the Ganga Basin: Public Policy
and Private Initiative
India by Bhalla and Singh (1997) shows that
during 1963–93, the productivity per male
agricultural worker crossed the Rs 10,000
barrier in much of India;
2 but most of eastern
India was not a part of it. The only region of
eastern India that seems to be crossing the
barrier is eastern UP (figure 1).
Eastern UP, the western-most part of
eastern India and the GMB basin, is an
interesting study because it has just managed
to break out of its agrarian stagnation. It is also
interesting because its transformation over the
past 15 years has been energized largely by the
rapid—and much needed—development of
small-scale groundwater irrigation; and offers
critical lessons about how the rest of the basin
can trigger off its belated Green Revolution. The
present analysis of eastern India—with
particular focus on eastern UP—is essentially a
study in political economy and practical policy.
It is about how major public policy initiatives
have actually impeded groundwater development
rather than accelerating it; and how spontaneous
market responses of a multitude of private
economic agents produced the social welfare
that public programs failed to produce. The
overarching lesson is that the seeds of an
effective strategy for groundwater-led
Tushaar Shah
Backdrop
1These estimates seem plausible; eastern India’s area of 348,000 square km is 10.6% of India’s total area but its 260 million people are over a
fourth of the Indian population. Add to this Bangladesh’s 280 million, and we already have over 500 million.
2In 1993, US$1.00=Indian Rs 33.63.
Eastern India, especially the 15 eastern districts
of UP and the entire States of Bihar, West
Bengal and parts of Orissa constitute a significant
chunk of the Ganga-Meghna-Brahmaputra (GMB)
basin that encompasses, in addition, all of
Bangladesh and the terai areas of Nepal. The
problem this report deals with and the strategy
outlined to respond to it are analyzed in the
east India context; but the analysis applies with
equal force to the terai areas of Nepal as also
to much of Bangladesh. The GMB basin has
fertile lands, but very high population pressure
(at over 830 for Bangladesh and over 600 for
eastern India in 1991 compared to 285 for India
as a whole) and, according to some estimates,
the basin is home to 500 million people, many
of whom are among the world’s poorest.
1 The
region is marked by high dependence of its
predominantly rural population on smallholder
agriculture and wage labor. In 1991, in Bihar
and eastern UP, the proportion of the population
dependent on agriculture was 79% compared to
66.7% for India as a whole. While western UP,
Haryana and the two Punjabs (Indian and
Pakistan) underwent massive agrarian
transformation during the 1960s, agrarian growth
in the eastern areas of India remained stagnant.
A district-wise analysis of agricultural growth in2
FIGURE 1.
The Ganga basin.3
agricultural development for all of eastern
India—and the GMB basin—are embedded in
the lessons offered by the experience of eastern
UP. In the second to the fifth sections our focus
then is on learning lessons from eastern UP. In
3The State’s annual average precipitation is 33 million ha-m; after making allowances for evaporation losses, the share of other States, require-
ments of industry, commercial and domestic users and others, it has a surface irrigation resource potential of 14–15 million ha-m and the total
groundwater resources are estimated at 8.5 million ha-m, all of which is nearly one-fifth of the all-India potential estimated at 43.18 million ha-m
(GOI 1996:9). After allowing 15% of the gross recharge for nonagricultural uses, the net recharge available for irrigation is 7.74 million ha-m.
Because of its inefficiency, surface water is estimated to be capable of irrigating 13.7 million ha (with a delta of well over 1 meter). In contrast,
UP’s groundwater resources can irrigate around 20.3 million ha (with a delta of 0.38 m), taking the ultimate irrigation potential of the State to 34
million ha.
4The UP State Groundwater Department monitors groundwater levels through a network of 4,000 hydrograph stations including 500 shallow
piezometers located throughout the State except the hill areas (GoUP 1996b).
the last two sections, we explore their
implications for eastern India as a whole and
evolve a five-point strategy to stimulate
groundwater irrigation for livelihood creation in
the Ganga basin.
Groundwater Resources of Eastern India
There are abundant surface water and
groundwater resources in eastern and northeastern
India. Figure 2, based on estimates, which have
recently been revised upward, prepared by
India’s Central Groundwater Board, suggests
that of the total usable recharge of 325 km
3 for
India as a whole, 25%, or over 80 km
3 are
available to eastern and northeastern India.
These values exclude 16 districts of eastern
UP. If these were included, eastern India’s
groundwater resources would increase further to
92 km
3. Less than one-fourth of this resource is
in use at present.
The groundwater resources of UP are
abundant; its surface irrigation potential is
estimated at some 13–14 million ha; but
groundwater irrigation potential is estimated at
over 20 million ha, taking the total irrigation
potential to 33–34 million ha.
3, 
4 All of UP falls
in the piedmont zone of the Himalayas skirted
FIGURE 2.
Regional distribution of India’s usable groundwater recharge of 325 km2.4
by an artesian belt under free-flowing conditions
extending from Jammu and Kashmir in the west
to Tripura in the east. “The hydrological
environment and groundwater regime conditions
in the Indo-Ganga-Brahmaputra basin indicate
the existence of an enormous fresh groundwater
reservoir at least down to 600 m or more below
land surface. Bestowed with high incidence of
rainfall, this groundwater reservoir gets
replenished every year, the average annual
recharge throughout the GMB basin ranging
from 50 to 75 cm. Apart from the vertical
recharge, substantial recharge occurs through
horizontal absorption of water through the
Bhabhar zone, a 10–20 km wide strip of highly
pervious formation in the Himalayan foothills
through which all Himalayan rivers must pass.
The alluvial aquifers to the explored depth of
FIGURE 3.
Regional distribution of India’s 599 ‘dark’ blocks with over 85% groundwater development.
600 m have transmissivity values from 250 to
4,000 m
2/d and hydraulic conductivity from
10 to 800 m/d. Well yields range up to 100 lps
and more but yields of 40–100 lps are
common...” (GOI 1996:3).  Overall, then, while
peninsular India is searching for effective ways
to control groundwater overexploitation, the need
of eastern UP, as indeed of the rest of eastern
India, is to step up the utilization of abundant
groundwater resources for wealth creation and
poverty alleviation. Of India’s 7,063 blocks,
5 599
are dark.
6 Figure 3 shows that only 1% of these
are in eastern and northeastern India. Similarly,
figure 4 sets out the distribution of white, gray
and dark blocks in different subregions of UP.
For UP as a whole, less than 2.5% of the
blocks are designated dark; and nearly 80% are
denoted as white, offering much scope for
5A “block” consists roughly of 100 villages; and it is a basic geographic unit between a village and a district.
6In India, the groundwater administration classifies blocks under three categories based on the extent of groundwater development. Blocks
where groundwater draft is less than 65% of the available resources are categorized as “white;” those with between 65% and 85% development
are classified as “gray;” and those with more than 85% development are classified as “dark.” While new groundwater development is strongly
discouraged in dark areas it is encouraged in “white” areas.5
tapping unutilized irrigation potential. Eastern UP
offers even greater promise: 289 of its 345
blocks (84%) are white; 50 (14%) are gray and
just 6 (2%) are designated dark. The problem of
overdevelopment is more acute in Western UP
where groundwater irrigation has developed
faster than in other parts of UP over the past
two decades.
If anything, this already abundant
groundwater recharge of eastern UP is only
further augmented by newly developed canal
irrigation. A good deal—in fact, nearly one-
fourth—of UP’s groundwater recharge is
contributed by canal irrigation, according to the
estimates by the State Groundwater Department
(GoUP 1996b); however, this proportion is
probably even higher, for water losses through
seepage are estimated to be 75% in many
systems with unlined canal distributary
networks. In this flood-prone region, floodwaters
FIGURE 4.
Uttar Pradesh:  Distribution of blocks (%) according to level of groundwater utilization in relation to available net recharge.
too contribute to recharge as do the shallow
water tables to which recharge gets added.
All in all, the available irrigation potential,
estimated using liberal norms for water
requirements of crops, is 1.33 times the State’s
1991 gross cropped area of 25.5 million ha, offering
ample scope for raising the State’s overall average
cropping intensity from the present 148% to 200%,
or even more, since the bulk of the unutilized
potential is in groundwater. Already, 6 out of the
13.7 million ha potential of surface irrigation are
utilized; but only 6 million ha of the 20.3 million ha
(gross) of available groundwater potential are used,
leaving room to bring over 14 million ha more
under groundwater irrigation. The potential for
further groundwater development is even greater
further eastward, as in north Bihar and north
Bengal where the available recharge is as great as
or greater than—but whose utilization is far lower
than—in eastern UP.6
The Case for Stimulating Groundwater Development in Eastern India
technology, more crops under irrigated
conditions, cropping pattern diversification
in favor of high-value crops and a large
summer crop which is by and large
nonexistent.
Northern India’s Green Revolution has
generally been credited to early public
investments made in canal irrigation in that
region. However, it has also been argued that
the rise of the Green Revolution in Punjab,
Haryana and western UP was fueled more by
the private tube-well revolution; and that its
refusal to progress eastward from Lucknow,
which divides western from eastern India in the
north, is explained by the slow pace of
groundwater development in the east (Dhawan
1982). Several reasons explain this: a) many
studies—including macro-level—have shown
unmistakable evidence that fertilizer use is
directly and significantly related to tube-well
irrigation (see, e.g., GOI 1985); b) numerous
There are compelling reasons for stimulating
rapid and fuller development of groundwater
resources in eastern India: first, it can be an
important part of a strategy for correcting the
regional imbalance in the development of the
east versus the west; second, it can be a
direct response to the region’s rural poverty;
third, undeveloped, the region’s high pre-
monsoonal groundwater table accentuates its
condition of flood-proneness and waterlogging.
Eastern India constitutes the bulk of India’s
“poverty square.” It is largely rural, predominantly
agricultural, and has a high population density.
As a microcosm of eastern India, this east-west
development dichotomy is apparent in UP, too.
While western UP forged ahead with the Green
Revolution in the 1960s and 70s, eastern UP
lagged behind in most respects (table 1).
The region needs a strong push in its
agriculture sector to promote wider spread
of the High-Yielding Variety (HYV) seed
Eastern UP Western UP
Population km2 (1991) 614 602
GW potential as % of  gross recharge (1990) 75 67
Gross irrigated area as % of Grass Cropped Area (GCA) 46.9 76.7
% of total irrigated area served by canal (89-90) 29.3 23.4
% of  irrigated area served by tube wells (89-90) 63.2 68.8
% of all farmholdings in <1 ha (marginal) 81.3 65
Average size of the marginal holding (ha) 0.32 0.4
Fertilizer use  80-81 (kg/ha) 48.87 57.6
Fertilizer use 89-90 (kg/ha) 80.92 100.53
Wheat yield 80-81 (kg/ha) 14.62 19.4
Wheat yield 89-90 (kg/ha) 18.1 24.52
Paddy yield 80-81(kg/ha) 9.11 14.08
Paddy yield 89-90 (kg/ha) 16.13 21.73
Area under summer crop as % of GCA 2.01 4.42
Area under cash crops as % of GCA   1980–81 10.06 26.85
Area under cash crops as % of GCA 1989–90 10.37 31.61
Gross income per ha of net sown area 1988–89 8,872 11,612
Source: GoUP 1996a.
TABLE 1.
East and West: Regional disparities in agrarian performance in UP, India.7
micro-level studies based on sample surveys
show that pump-irrigated farms perform much
better compared to those irrigated by any other
source in terms of cropping intensity, input use
and yields
7 (see, e.g., Dhawan 1985); and c) by
common observation, this difference between
areas irrigated by private tube wells and those
irrigated by gravity flow canals is obviously
explained by the superior quality—in terms of
reliability, timeliness, adequacy—of irrigation
that tube wells offer compared to other sources
(Chambers et al. 1987; Shah 1993). As far back
as 1985, a study group constituted by India’s
Planning Commission to explore agricultural
strategies in eastern India noted that “one major
reason for the low yield levels of eastern region
States compared to the rest of India, particularly
the chief rice-growing States viz., Andhra
Pradesh and Tamilnadu, is the much lower level
of irrigation in the former. About three-fourths of
the rice area in the eastern region is still
cultivated under the uncertain monsoonal
conditions affected by floods as well as
draughts” (GOI 1985:1).
Finally, increased density of wells can
increase the welfare of the people in the eastern
region through the powerful positive externality
they produce by acting as an antidote to
waterlogging and flood-proneness. Much of
eastern India, particularly eastern UP, north
Bihar, Kuchbehar and Jalpaiguri districts in north
Bengal and parts of Orissa are flood-prone.
According to the estimates made by the UP
Groundwater Department, 3.4 million ha-m of
the total 8.42 million ha-m of groundwater
recharge that UP gets annually occur from
canal irrigation (1.24 million ha-m), surface
irrigation reflows (0.69 million ha-m), recharge
from tanks, lateral recharge from flood-prone
areas and from shallow water-table areas
(GoUP 1996b). This surfeit of groundwater
recharge increases as one moves from west to
east. In eastern UP, vast areas remain
inundated by flood waters for the better part of
the year, and acute waterlogging characterizes
the Saryu-par areas in the middle of the Ganga
basin—bordered in the south by the Ghaghra
river and spread over Gorakhpur, Maharajganj,
Deoria, Siddharthnagar, Basti, Gonda and
Bahraich districts. The entire area, which
encompasses nearly a tenth of UP, has an
acute problem of subsoil water drainage and,
consequently, a uniformly high groundwater table
at 3–5 meters. Ghaghra, Rapti, and Gandak are
notorious flood-creating rivers but even smaller
rivers like Rohini, Burhi Rapti, Ami, Kuwano,
Gurra, Tons, Kunhra, Ghonghi, Burha Gandak,
Chhota Gandak, Taraina too contribute their
deluge in flooding the region (Wajih and Kumar
nd). Rapti alone inundates 350,000 ha every
year in Bahraich, Gonda, Basti, Siddharthnagar
and Deoria (Yadav and Lal 1994; nd). Estimates
made from remote sensing data of the area
under flood inundation and surface waterlogging









during September 2–6, 1988 showed that 1.089
million ha—including croplands—were
7Regression equations on survey data typically have low coefficients of determination and large values for the intercept—representing the weight
of the omitted variables—indicating some specification problem. Production functions based on a survey of 380 farmers in Gorakhpur, Basti,
Deoria, Siddharthnagar and Maharjganj districts of eastern UP conducted by Shah et al. (1997) showed the following results:.
Paddy:   qp = 4.840 . Fp
 0.269 .Lp 0.128. Hp 0.050                 R2 = 0.204
                       [15.3]**   [4.29]**  [2.68]**   [1.203]
Wheat:  qw = 4.873   .Hw.0.155. Lw 0.124.  Hw.0.137             R2 = 0.325
                     [9.059]**   [2.877]**    [2.972]**    [3.292 ]**
where, subscripts p and w refer to kharif (rainy season) paddy and rabi (dry season) wheat, q refers to output/acre (kg); F refers to fertilizer use/
acre (kg), L is hired labor/acre (person-days) and H refers to hours of pump irrigation used per acre. R
2 is unacceptable and the intercept term
unusually large; t-ratios and the elasticities, however, are significant. The coefficient for irrigation hours was large and highly significant for
wheat, that for kharif paddy was small and insignificant, presumably because kharif paddy in eastern UP is predominantly rain-fed.8
“completely/partially inundated” and 0.678 million
ha had surface waterlogging (Kolavalli et al.
1989: 81). Every year, floods hit over 15% of
eastern UP’s croplands; and over half of the
region has groundwater tables of less than 5 m
in the pre-monsoon period (ibid.). According to a
study undertaken by the Gorakhpur
Environmental Action Group, some 0.398 million
ha-m of water are added to the groundwater
table every year; of this, only 0.064 million ha-
m (around 16%) are abstracted through various
irrigation structures. Waterlogging and flood-
proneness are aggravated by the large-scale
erection of embankments
8 in the Gorakhpur and
Deoria districts, which further impede drainage
and accentuate waterlogging.
9
Flood-proneness and waterlogging have hit
the lives and livelihoods of people in a myriad
ways. Between 1951 and 1981, the area
cultivated in kharif in the Gandak River Project
command fell from 214,000 ha to 68,000 ha due
to annual flooding and surface waterlogging
(Yadav and Lal nd). High flood-proneness
induces risk aversion; as a result, in these
areas, farmers clung to traditional mixed-crop
farming technologies, which offered some
insurance cover against flood risks and
minimized cash costs of cultivation. The
tradition of animal husbandry too has been
undergoing change due to waterlogging; as
grazing lands remain submerged in water for
long periods, the population of large bovines has
declined. Marginal farmers and landless have
increasingly taken to piggery. Flooding and
waterlogging have also brought in their wake a
variety of health-related disadvantages;
incidence of diseases like malaria, Japanese
encephalitis and filaria is rampant. Moreover,
due to flooding and waterlogging, soluble iodine
is washed away or removed by seepage,
causing severe iodine deficiency (Wajih and
Kumar 1994). Over a third of the usar (sodic)
lands of UP are largely an outcome of the
rapidly rising water tables causing waterlogging
conditions in extensive areas of the State. In
saline lands, vegetation exists only in kharif
and the pH is lower than 8.5; in saline-
alkaline lands, the most common variety of
usar lands, the presence of a kankar pan
(layer of limestone and clay) causes water
stagnation.
Much has been made of the need to
“augment” lean season flows in Ganga; indeed,
insufficiency of Ganga waters to meet the
summer needs has been a major bone of
contention in India-Bangladesh discussions on
the sharing of Ganga waters. But as many
observers have suggested, such augmentation
is outside the realm of feasibility; and the best
approach to achieving seasonal water balance is
better and more integrated management of the
basin as a whole (see, e.g., Ramaswamy
1999:2,296). The centerpiece of such a strategy
has to be increased subsurface retention and
storage of peak-flows for use in the lean
seasons; and the most practical and cost-
effective way of doing this is through rapid
groundwater development.
8With the coming of embankments, sugarcane has emerged as a popular crop in some parts; however, in recent years, sugarcane cultivators,
especially small and politically lightweight ones, have got caught in an infructuous crossfire between the government and sugar mill manage-
ments; many sugar mills have closed shutters; and those which continue to operate have to ration the quota of cane supply leading to astronomi-
cal premia in the illegal markets for sugarcane supply rights (in the form of ganne-ki-parchi [cane purchase indent from sugar factory]).
9In Deoria and Gorakhpur districts, the water table has risen over the 1971–91 period by 0.63 m and 0.36 m. In Padrauna, Salempur, Hata and
Deoria tehsils (blocks) of the undivided Deoria district, waterlogged areas increased by 60–90% over the 1971–91 period due to the Gandak
canal system; in Gorakhpur Sadar, Bansgaon, Pharendra and Maharjganj tehsils of the undivided Gorakhpur district, waterlogged areas in-
creased by 65–95% over the same period. The Gandak command has a canal network of over 10,000 km irrigating 55% of the net sown area,
and giving 6 km of canals to every square kilometer (Wajih and  Kumar 1994). Nearly 0.45 million ha in Sharda Sahayak command and 0.25
million ha in the Gandak command are waterlogged (GOI 1985). Nearly two-thirds of the area irrigated by Sharda Sahayak was waterlogged in
1987; and in 50,000 ha in the Gandak command, the water table depth was just around 1 meter (Yadav and Lal nd).9
A major reason for eastern India’s
waterlogging and flood-proneness is insufficient
conjunctive use of groundwater and surface
water. Just as excessive groundwater draft
results in drying of springs and reduced base-
flow in rivers, too little of it adds to the swelling
of rivers and streams at peak-flows in the form
of “rejected recharge.”  Ideally, groundwater
development should match canal irrigation,
especially in ill-drained soils as encountered in
much of eastern India; but as figure 5 shows, in
eastern UP districts, the development of both
groundwater and surface water has lacked this
balance. As far back as 1948, a commission
appointed by the Government of UP asserted
that the flood problems of eastern UP were “due
to reduction in the absorptive capacity of the
soil” (Yadav and Lal 1994). This “reduction” has
been magnified with the development of
intensive canal irrigation during the last five
decades since then. Particularly after 1950, the
laying out of new canal networks, most of them
unlined, has resulted in a rapid and persistent
rise in groundwater tables that, in turn, has
resulted in large areas being waterlogged for
5–6 months after the last of the monsoonal
rains. This problem, which has bewitched the
entire eastern India, was further aggravated by
the construction of countless embankments, first
by the erstwhile Zamindaars, and more recently
under government programs, which were
intended to protect communities and farmlands
from flash floods but have been producing
exactly the opposite impact (Mishra 1999a;
1999b). As in eastern UP, Bihar’s flood-prone
area too tripled from 2.5 million ha in 1954 to
6.8 million ha in 1994—which means that 70%
of the population in north Bihar, some 30 million
people, are at risk from floods every year (ibid.).
Many strategies have been recommended
and tried out to deal with the intensification of
the flood-proneness and waterlogging in eastern
UP as a consequence of the growth of canal
irrigation. But there has been growing
consensus that the most important long-term
strategy to fight flood-proneness is the rapid
increase in groundwater irrigation, which will not
only lower water tables but also help reduce the
intensity of floods and the average period of
flooding by enhancing the underground storage
for flood waters, canal seepage as well as
irrigation reflows. Reviewing the suggestions
FIGURE 5.
Percent of irrigated area served by surface water and groundwater in eastern UP.10
Public Policy: State and Community Tube-Well Program
made by several experts, the Delhi-based
Center for Science and Environment (CSE 1991:
121–122) wrote:
“…that active development of groundwater
reservoirs by extensive irrigation pumping
during the dry season can provide
substantial capacity to store flood and
drainage waters during the wet season.
Preliminary calculations made in USA
indicate that full development of conjunctive
use in the Ganga basin could lead to as
much as a 50% reduction in the monsoon
flow of the river. Thus groundwater
utilization can not only contribute to full
realization of the agricultural potential of the
region but would also be effective in
reducing and preventing waterlogging
conditions, which have come to be an
imminent threat in considerable tracts of
north Bihar [as indeed much of eastern
India]. The measure could considerably
alleviate the flood problem of the region
through provision of underground storage of
monsoon flows. [However], the desired
development of groundwater in this area has
been inhibited by the preponderance of
marginal farmers who cannot afford the
investment required in installation of tube
wells...”
The preponderance of marginal farmers and
their lack of capacity to make tube-well
investments have then been the central
challenge in stimulating poverty-focused
groundwater development in eastern India. And
all government and NGO initiatives since 1950
have been designed to respond to this
challenge. Early thinking was aimed at
organizing the poor for collectively managing an
irrigation asset or through an extensive and
vigorous public tube-well (PTW) program.
Eastern UP offers examples of both these
institutional options, although there is only one
significant case of tube wells owned and
managed by farmer groups. This experiment
was promoted in the Deoria district of UP and
the Vaishali district in Bihar by a local NGO
under the Indo-Norwegian Agricultural
Development Project. Niranjan Pant who
followed the rise and fall of the farmer-managed
tube wells over a period spanning more than a
decade, wrote in the early 1980s, “the wells
owned and operated by groups of small and
marginal farmers were found to be doing a very
satisfying job… the management of each tube
well was the responsibility of the group of
farmers and the group leader…[and they] were
quite successful from the point of view of
accessibility of groundwater among the
resource-poor farmers” (Pant 1984). But when
he revisited the groups in Deoria in 1988, “to
our dismay, we found many of the groups which
existed in 1983 had disintegrated...The main
reason... [was that] the commands of the group
of tube wells were subsumed under the World
Bank tube wells...the World Bank tube-well
water was available at a much cheaper rate...”
(Pant 1989: 97–98).
A few years later, the PTW program, which
had its own shortcomings and which
cannibalized the Deoria tube-well groups, itself
fell to the predatory onslaught of the booming
local pump-irrigation markets. By 1990, there
were nearly 30,000 large PTWs strewn all over
UP’s countryside, constructed with financial
support from the Dutch and the World Bank. Its
failings however soon began to come to the
fore. In the mid-1980s, the PTW program was11
losing around Rs 650–700 million/yr. (Kolavalli
and Shah 1989); in the 1990s, the annual losses
exceeded Rs 1,000 million. A new program
launched in the late 1970s with World Bank-
support promoted several new design features
such as dedicated power supply to a cluster of
25 PTWs linked to an independent 11 kV line,
buried pipelines, automatic operation of wells,
tamper-proof outlets, and the system of
osrabandi (an arrangement for rotational water
supply to irrigators) for water allocation
overseen by an elected farmer committee and
executed by a part-time operator chosen from
the area itself.
This, too, however, failed to arrest the
downward spin in the performance of PTWs.
They did better than conventional PTWs while
they were new. However, as they advanced in
age, the performance of the World Bank tube
wells declined too. For instance, the average
number of hours and area irrigated per tube well
fell from 2,304 hours and 77 ha in 1976–77 to
780 hours and 35 ha in 1983–84 (ibid.); the
downward spin continued thereafter. A study of
the “new design” PTWs in Faizabad, Basti and
Deoria districts by Pant concluded that only a
third of the farmers in the command could
depend upon the PTWs exclusively for their
irrigation needs; 60% of the PTWs had
nonfunctioning meters; 30% of PTWs did not
have farmer committees and in the rest, the
committees had seldom met; the performance of
tube wells themselves was quite poor compared
to what was planned; the highest realizable
revenue by PTWs was less than needed to
meet the operator’s salary (Pant 1989).
Different researchers have found marginally
different clusters of reasons explaining the
failure of the UP PTW program. Kolavalli and
Shah (1989) blamed insufficient and erratic
power supply, inadequate conveyance systems,
operator-absenteeism, failure of the osrabandi
system and poor maintenance as the main
reasons. In addition to all these, Pant (1989)
also found the organization-design failure to be
an important factor: “[operators] thought they
were accountable to irrigation officials rather
than to command farmers or to the Tube-Well
Management Committee. Consequently, the
distribution was done more or less in an
arbitrary manner. The core component of water
distribution system such as osrabandi, opening
of one outlet at a time in a loop and beneficiary
involvement were conspicuous by their
absence.” (Pant 1989:100). Palmer-Jones (1995:
iv) concluded that, quite apart from the complex
institutional issues, “DTWs were and are an
inappropriate technology for the social and
economic conditions encountered in developing
countries of South Asia…”
An important insight of Pant’s study was
that the PTWs stimulated the emergence of an
active pump irrigation market in their
commands, which made the PTWs themselves
increasingly redundant! Contrary to a priori
supposition, the number of private tube wells
increased rapidly once an area got covered by
a World Bank PTW command, in Faizabad, by
54% and in Deoria, by 33%. Over two-thirds of
the PTW command farmers used other private
tube-well irrigation; and of these, only a quarter
owned tube wells, the rest purchased irrigation
from private tube-well owners (TWOs) (Pant
1989:90). When the first generation PTWs came
up in UP in the 1940s and 50s, private tube-well
development was all but nonexistent. In fact,
even in the 1970s, when the community tube-
well experiment was carried out, eastern UP
had very little private tube-well development.
During the 1980s, however, the growth of
private tube wells was truly rapid; and in their
wake came the practice of water selling. Indeed,
both the community tube wells and PTWs faced
growing farmer apathy and disinterest because
private water sellers rapidly made deep inroads
into their command, established themselves as
market leaders and reduced PTWs to the status
of suppliers of supplemental irrigation.12
Rise of Pump-Irrigation Markets: 1960￿90
Studies in the 1980s and 90s (Kolavalli et al.
1989; Kolavalli et al. 1992; Lall and Pachauri
1994; Pant 1992; Pant 1989; Shankar nd; Shankar
1992; Shah 1993; Shah et al. 1997), however,
showed that a fitting response to this important
equity issue came not from PTW programs but
from private water markets.
As far back as the 1960s, purchased pump
irrigation from PTW owners was an important
way for the resource-poor farmers to gain
access to groundwater irrigation. However, the
power and reach of this new institution were
beginning to get recognized only during the late
1980s as the South Asian water market debate
opened up. Most of these researchers found
that compared to the lackadaisical PTW
operators, private pump owners were
surprisingly eager providers of irrigation
services, taking on their competition by lowering
the price and improving the quality of service.
Much emerging evidence seems to suggest that
although pump irrigation markets appeared to
have wrecked public and collective irrigation
institutions that focused upon securing irrigation
FIGURE 6.
Scale bias in tube-well ownership: Survey of 380 farmers in eastern UP (Shah et al. 1997).
Even without its failings, the PTW program would
not have played more than a marginal role in UP’s
Green Revolution. At full strength of 30,000 tube
wells all working to their full capacity, the program
would have developed no more than 1% of UP’s
groundwater potential. And a program much bigger
than this would prove unmanageable in the best of
conditions. Growing private investment in tube-well
irrigation was thus a godsend for UP agriculture.
One reason why interest in PTWs and community
tube wells persisted long after they were proved
unsustainable was the question of equity in
access to groundwater appropriation and use by
the resource-poor farmers who could not mobilize
the chunky capital investment needed in tube-well
installation. By the turn of the 1980s, a distinct
pecking order had emerged in the organization of
eastern India’s groundwater economy: TWOs were
typically medium-sized farmers while marginal
farmers depended heavily on purchased pump
irrigation and on manual lift irrigation by devices
like treadle pumps. Figure 6, which reports on a
1997 survey of some 300 farmers in eastern UP,
suggests this pecking order (see, Shah et al. 1997).13
access for the poor, ironically, it was the poor
water buyers who disowned PTWs and
community tube wells to turn to private water
markets because of their superior and more
reliable—even if apparently costlier—irrigation
service.
Late in the 1980s, Niranjan Pant reanalyzed
his 1981 survey of 280 farmers in Deoria,
Barabanki and Meerut districts and concluded
that whereas only 27.7% of the farmers owned
bore wells and 63.3% purchased irrigation water
from pump owners.  He found water trade
deeper and broader in Barabanki or Meerut
further west than in Deoria in the eastern parts
probably because the latter had a lower pump
density: “In Deoria, an average tube well served
7.1 clients; in Barabanki and Meerut, it served
2.3 and 2.6 clients, respectively. On average,
27.1 acres (of owner’s and his clients’ lands)
were irrigated by a private tube well in Deoria
compared to 16.1 acres in Meerut and 6.9 acres
in Barabanki” (Pant 1989: 89).
In 1988, Pant explored water markets in the
course of extensive fieldwork throughout the
eastern region and wrote: “A common feature
found in all eastern region States was sale and
purchase of water on an hourly basis. The rates
varied...and ranged between Rs 8 and 25/hour
from a 5-hp pump/ tube well…” [Pant 1991: 276].
Further, exploring the comparative reach
amongst the poor of water markets, World Bank
tube wells and canal irrigation in Faizabad and
Bahraich, amongst India’s poorest districts,
10
Pant concluded that “The operation of the
private groundwater markets appears to be very
beneficial for farmers [in <0.4 ha and
0.4< II<1.0 ha categories]” (see table 2).
11 In
TABLE 2.
Key results of Pant 1992 on water markets in Faizabad
and Bahraich districts of eastern UP.
 Faizabad Bahraich
Owner Buyer Owner Buyer
1. % of pump owners
selling water 90.6 75.7
2. % of water buyers
owning tube wells 33.3 17.2
3. Average # of buyers
per tube well 4.4 4.3
4. Average # of sellers
used by buyers 2.1 1.9
5. % of  buyers irrigating
wheat with purchased water 71 82
6. % of buyers irrigating paddy
with purchased water 76 88
10Pant selected 14 villages for his study, 7 from each district of which 4 each had World Bank tube wells; two each were outside the command of
any public irrigation source; and one each had a canal. Farmers with and without pumps were chosen from each of the 14 villages.  Of the total
sample of 247 farmers, roughly half owned private tube wells; the rest did not. Pant’s study was thus specifically designed for comparative
analysis of groundwater markets versus public systems as deliverers of irrigation service to the resource poor.
11Further “amongst the category <0.4 ha farmers, 64% in Faizabad and 53% in Bahraich irrigate their wheat crop with water purchased from
owners of private pumps. Among the category 0.4<II<1 farmers, the Faizabad data show that 42% of them depend on purchased water which is
the largest single category. In Faizabad, even a great chunk (28%) of the category of 1 ha< III<2 ha farmers depend on purchased water for their
wheat irrigation…” (Pant 1989).
contrast, Pant found that both World Bank
PTWs and the canal system benefited primarily
the well-off.  “...the World Bank-assisted tube
wells in Faizabad at least cater to the needs of
the poor to some extent, while in Bahraich,
such tube wells cater to the needs of the
relatively well-off…” And then “...canal as a
public source of irrigation is worse than public
tube wells and among the two districts, it is
much worse in Faizabad...”
For the poorest farmers in eastern India,
then, the benefits of groundwater irrigation have
come through three routes: in large part,
through purchased pump irrigation and, in a
small way, through improved manual irrigation
technologies as well as through the Free Boring
Scheme (FBS). In manual technologies, the14
most notable has been the introduction of the
treadle pump, which is particularly suited to
farmers with less than a hectare of land
because it requires an investment of less than
Rs 700, and can deliver up to 1 l/s without any
cash cost of operation. The treadle pump has
been gaining in popularity; however, it faces
tough competition from private pump irrigation
sellers. In fact, a 1996 survey (Shah et al.
1997) to assess the impact of treadle pumps in
eastern UP showed that treadle pump owners
invariably used purchased pump irrigation as
well. More importantly, it was impossible for
Shah et al. (1997) to find pure rain-fed farmers
in eastern UP; almost every farmer who does
not have own means of irrigation buys irrigation
service from private TWOs. Figure 7, based on
a survey of 134 TWOs, 151 farmers wholly
dependent on purchased pump irrigation and 95
treadle-pump owners, shows that, thanks to the
pump-irrigation markets, not having one’s own
tube well is not all that much of a disadvantage
because over 95% of the operated area in the
case of all the three categories is irrigated.
Another interesting finding of this survey was
the surprisingly small contribution of surface
water to smallholder irrigation. Considering that
the sample of 280 was chosen from 25 villages
in the Deoria and Maharajganj districts, which
have a large canal network, Shah et al. (1997)
had expected that canal irrigation would be an
important presence for the farmers surveyed.
Yet, it emerged that, after own tube wells,
purchased pump irrigation service was the
largest provider of smallholder irrigation; of the
1,000 odd acres operated by the 380 sample
farmers, 35% was served by the water market
(figure 8).
The downside of water markets is the high
cost of irrigation to the buyers, and the
pressure on them to economize on groundwater
use, especially in a region like eastern India,
where as we reviewed earlier, groundwater
withdrawal creates a powerful positive
externality. Many studies indicate that whereas
water markets have a wide reach, water buyers
invariably use less water (in terms of hours
pumped) compared to TWOs themselves.
Figure 9, for example, shows the relative
frugality of water use by water buyers in the
five districts of eastern UP from which
Shah et al. (1997) drew their sample of 380
FIGURE 7.
Percent of operated area irrigated: Eastern UP sample survey of 380 farmers (Shah et al. 1997).
Note: WEM = Water extraction mechanisms.15
FIGURE 8.
Contribution of water markets in eastern UP agriculture: Survey of 380 farmers (Shah et al. 1997).
FIGURE 9.
Water use/acre by TWOs and water buyers in eastern UP: Results from a survey of 380 farmers
(Shah et al. 1997).16
farmers. Other studies amply confirm this
finding. Based on his survey of 50 farmers in
Faizabad and 70 in Bahraich, Pant (1992)
similarly showed that the average water use
per ha by TWOs was 98 hours in Faizabad
and 36 hours in Bahraich; water use by
buyers was lower at 51.5 and 25.4 hours,
respectively. Based on a sample survey of
400 farmers from Gorakhpur, Sultanpur,
Mirzapur and Azamgadh districts of eastern UP,
Kolavalli et al. (1992) found that whereas 90%
of TWOs in Azamgadh and Sultanpur gave
more than 2 irrigation turns to paddy, more
than 75% of water buyers gave less than two
irrigation turns. Then Kolavalli et al. (1992:46)
noted:  “...a much smaller percentage of
farmers without wells irrigated their paddy
crop...It would suggest that paddy irrigation
appears to be less remunerative particularly if
irrigation is to be purchased.”
In 1996, water buyers in eastern UP paid
Rs 26–30/hour of pumping from 5-hp diesel
pumps with a yield of 18–20 m
3/hour. Irrigating
a hectare of paddy would need 70 hours and a
hectare of wheat in rabi would need 100 hours
costing Rs 1,960/ha and Rs 2,800/ha,
respectively. Canal irrigation rates for paddy and
wheat in UP have, for years, been Rs 180/ha
and Rs 70/ha, respectively. Thus irrigating
wheat and paddy with purchased tube-well water
is nearly 20 times costlier than canal irrigation.
It is not surprising that cash-starved water
buyers economize in the use of purchased
pump irrigation. An important aspect is also the
steeply rising cost of pump irrigation in
response to the rise in diesel prices. An early
hypothesis in the South Asian debate on water
markets was about the relationship between
energy cost and pump irrigation prices, which
emanated from a water seller’s profit function
and yielded the relation
w =  e/(e-1)*c
where, w is the price of pump irrigation
(Rs/hour), c is the incremental cost (Rs/hour) of
pumping facing the seller—which, in the case of
diesel pumps, is mainly the cost of diesel used
per hour; and e is the price elasticity of demand
for pump irrigation (see Shah 1993 for the
derivation). Since a rational seller will sell only
when e>1, e/(e-1) provides the multiple by
which water price will exceed the incremental
pumping cost. If e=1.4, water price will be
3.5 times the price of diesel/liter since a 5-hp
diesel engine consumes, on average, 1liter/hour.
And if the price of diesel increases by 10%, the
price of water will rise by 35% too and not just
enough to cover the increased diesel cost. In
1996, with the help of grassroots NGOs, this
author constructed time series of diesel-pump
irrigation prices in selected locations in eastern
UP and north Bihar, which suggested that water
prices increased every time diesel prices
increased and the former increased substantially
more than would be enough to cover the
increase in diesel price. Figure 10 presents
these data and also projects the likely impact of
the recent 35% hike in diesel prices on pump-
irrigation prices in eastern India; and depending
upon the degree of competition in local water
markets in different locations, we expect the
5-hp diesel-pump irrigation prices to rise to
between Rs 40–65/hour from the present
Rs 25–40/hour.
Overall, then, even with broad and deep
pump-irrigation markets that ensure small
farmers’ access to groundwater, questions still
remain about the cost of such access. Two
aspects are pertinent: first, water buyers are
under greater pressure to economize on water
use than pump owners, and this differential
pressure increases with every increase in diesel
price; and second, there is a transfer of wealth
from water buyers to pump owners with
progressive increase in diesel prices. Shah et
al. (1997) estimated that every hour of pump17
FIGURE 10.
The impact of 35% diesel price hike on pump irrigation prices (Rs/hour: 5-hp diesel pump).
irrigation sold in eastern India contained a
“monopoly rent” of Rs 10 in 1996 that would
disappear if the market became perfectly
competitive; assuming that each of the
2.2 million diesel pump owners in eastern India
sells 100 h/yr., we can surmise that water
buyers end up paying pump owners a monopoly
rent to the tune of Rs 2,200 million/yr. With the
1999 hike in diesel prices by 35%, we believe
this “rent” has more than doubled.
Progressive Rural De-Electrification of Eastern UP
The policy of the Government of UP on rural
electrification did to catalyze pump irrigation
markets what its PTW program did to initiate
the revolution in the private tube wells. During
the 1960s, governments as well as donors such
as the World Bank placed great emphasis on
rural electrification as a means to overall
development, but particularly, of agricultural
development through tube-well irrigation. As a
result of this intensive effort, the number of
electric tube wells (ETWs) rose rapidly,
particularly in western UP, and to a lesser
extent, even in eastern UP. The capital
investment in electric pumps was higher
because a portion of the cost of laying the
cable from the transformer to the well site was
charged to the TWOs. Diesel pumps were
cheaper to buy but were less preferred because
they were substantially costlier to operate. The
high investment costs of ETWs encouraged
their owners to operate their pumps at a high
level of capacity utilization by supplying
irrigation service to other farmers. Thus arose
the new institution of pump-irrigation markets;18
and private ETWs began playing pretty much
the same role as PTWs were envisaged to do—
viz., providing tube-well irrigation service to
small and marginal farmers—but in a more
service-oriented and economically profitable
manner.
However, by the early 1970s, the logistics
of metering electricity supply and collecting the
tariff was beginning to prove too much for the
UP State Electricity Board (UP SEB), which had
hired an army of meter readers to take readings
on the rapidly growing numbers of household
and tube-well connections in UP’s vast
countryside.
12 The meter readers who were
initially appointed on contract during the early
1960s soon unionized and eventually forced a
populist Chief Minister to regularize them as
government employees with manyfold increases
in wages and benefits. Soon thereafter, the
quality of meter reading declined, and so did the
collection of electricity charges. It was easy to
bribe or browbeat meter readers into
underreporting the consumption or tampering
with the meter; moreover, to beat metering,
farmers began to pilfer power by hooking
directly to power lines since there was little to
deter them. These logistical problems multiplied
manyfold when it came to dealing with metering
electricity consumption for millions of tiny
household users (with just 1–2 40-W bulbs). All
in all, a major rethink on the logistics of
metering and revenue collection in rural
electricity supply had become inevitable.
Around then, a 1973 study by the Rural
Electrification Corporation encompassing several
States found that the cost of metering electricity
consumption by farmers and rural households
was over 40% of the cost of the power itself!
UP was not the only State that was facing
these problems; all States did. So in 1975,
when the SEB decided to get rid of metering of
rural household and farm users, and switch to a
flat monthly tariff unlinked to actual
consumption, many other State governments
were watching the implications with great
interest; and in the following 5 years, most
other Indian SEBs followed suit and changed
from a metered to a flat electricity tariff,
especially for agricultural users.
The change to a flat tariff gave a powerful
stimulus to pump irrigation markets; it raised
the fixed cost but reduced the incremental
pumping cost to almost zero. This meant that
the ETW owners had a powerful incentive to
sell more water; and competition amongst
electric pump owners forced a lowering of the
price of pump irrigation, improved the quality of
service and, in general, created a buyers’
market for pump irrigation. Comparative surveys
across States during the 1980s showed that two
5-hp electric pump owners, one in Meerut
(western UP) and the other in Basti (eastern
UP), sold pump irrigation at Rs 5–6/hour
whereas a similar electric-pump owner in
Gujarat charged Rs 20/hour because he was
paying for metered power use. Diesel pump
owners in UP, who charged Rs 18–20/hour for a
5-hp pump in UP as elsewhere, began losing
out in their competition with electric pump
owners; there is some evidence to suggest that
diesel pump owners in many areas were obliged
to slash their pump irrigation prices to survive
12UP has 110,000 villages; and many of these have 4–5 hamlets each. Consumption-based tariff involved metering, meter reading, meter repair
and maintenance and revenue collection. In an effort to reduce cost—and to secure more committed and involved ground-level staff—the SEB
had recruited local people to serve as meter readers on contractual appointments at lower salaries than the SEB’s staff got as State government
employees. Each meter reader had to monitor and report on around 100 meters per month. Less than 2 years after this arrangement was
initiated, SEB inspections revealed that many meter readers sub-contracted the work to schoolboys at a fraction of their daily allowance while
they busied themselves with their farms and other businesses. Soon, they began to save on even this and stopped taking and reporting the
readings at all. So farmers would be billed on the basis of their average consumption over the past months. Some meter readers began to
arbitrarily report hypothetical figures of consumption. Farmers also began breaking their meters so that they could be charged on the average of
low consumption reported in earlier months.19
in the competition. All in all, the resource-poor
farmers—who were mostly buyers of pump
irrigation—had the best possible deal they could
hope for in the early years after the change to a
flat electricity tariff.
13
However, this state of happiness was
proven short-lived. While changing from a
metered to a flat tariff, the SEB was governed
by the economics of power supply as well as
by the politics of power. Compared to many
other States, especially in South India, where
political leaders used the change to a flat tariff
as an opportunity to do away with power tariff
itself, either fully or largely, in UP the flat tariff
was fixed at a reasonable Rs 18 (US$1.3)/hp/
month at which the SEB would have been close
to the breakeven point for the pre-change level
of average electricity consumption, particularly
since the flat tariff eliminated substantial costs
of metering and pilferage associated with
metered tariff. However, what the SEB had not
planned for was the rapid increase in the
electricity consumption per tube well after the
change to the flat tariff. The very process that
transformed pump-irrigation markets into a boon
for the resource-poor farmers—and heralded a
new promise for eastern UP’s belated Green
Revolution—was also playing havoc with the
SEB’s balance sheet. Ideally, the SEB should
have put up the flat tariff with the rising of the
average power consumption per tube well; and it
did manage to raise it from Rs 25/hp/month in
the early 1980s to Rs 30/hp/month in the late
1980s and further to Rs 50/hp/month in the
early 1990s.
14 This was creditable compared to
many southern Indian States that used the flat
tariff to supply free electricity. However, the
increases in the flat tariff implemented over the
25-year period were far less than needed to
cover the full cost of agricultural power supply.
The medium and large farmers, especially in
western UP, who owned most of the ETWs,
were getting organized into a noisy, at times
militant, formation under Mahendra Singh Tikait,
a Jat farmer leader from western UP; and they
put paid to every move by the SEB to put up
the flat tariff.
Like every monopolist, the SEB had control
over either the price or the quantity of the
product it supplied to a market segment but not
both. In the post-flat-tariff years, the UP SEB
increasingly faced erosion of its power to set
the electricity price. Therefore, intuitively, it
reached out for the only other lever at its
command: supply. It brought in progressive
restriction in the supply of power to agricultural
users in an orderly and transparent manner.
However, the farmer lobby quickly saw through
the SEB’s game and launched a fierce agitation
leading the Chief Minister and other political
leaders to publicly and repeatedly announce
their resolve to maintain power supply to
agriculture to a minimum of 18 hours/day.
Something had to give; but since the
government would not displease the militant Jat
interests in western UP, the axe had to fall
elsewhere. Thus began an invidious process of
progressive rural de-electrification of eastern UP.
13According to Pant’s analysis, some 91% of the TWOs in Faizabad and 76% in Bahraich sold pump irrigation; an average seller served 4 buyers
in both districts. Some 33% and 17% of buyers in Faizabad and Bahraich, respectively, were themselves pump owners, but used purchased
water to irrigate their far-flung parcels. An average buyer dealt with 2 sellers. Electrified TWOs—who had to pay a flat electricity tariff of Rs 25/hp/
month—sold water at Rs 3–5/hour. Generally, 3–hp TWOs charged Rs 3/hour and 5–hp TWOs charged Rs 5/ hour. Electrified TWOs also offered
a lump sum irrigation contract; the average rate was Rs 313/acre for the whole season; in this arrangement, the buyer could take as many
irrigation turns as needed when electricity was available. Diesel TWOs sold only on a per hour basis: at Rs 12/hour for a 3-inch delivery pipe
and at Rs 14/hour for a 4-inch delivery pipe. Pump irrigation purchased from diesel pump owners was substantially costlier. The terms of pump
irrigation sale also included an offer of credit. Part-payment was made in cash; this was typically half the cost of diesel; the rest was paid at the
time of harvest.
14This was later slashed to Rs 40/hp/month by Prime Minister Devegauda in a preelection bonanza.20
While the political leadership went on
promising guaranteed power supply to
agriculture, the SEB, powerless to perform
positive acts of commission, took to unobtrusive
acts of omission, and began systematically
neglecting the maintenance of power supply
infrastructure in some of the most backward
areas of the State where the farmers were far
less organized and militant than Jats in western
UP. This process of omission was slow;
cessation of investment in maintenance and
repair—and the resulting erosion of the
element—took time to take effect; but slowly
and surely it did and began to translate in
declining quality and reliability of power supply.
By the close of the 1980s, only 1–1.5% of
transformers in eastern UP used to be “down;”
in the early 1990s, 20% of the transformers
were found to be nonfunctional at any point in
time (Tyagi 1995). Stolen cables stopped being
replaced; broken-down transformers often took
6–12 months to fix. Although, technically, the
SEB supplied close to guaranteed hours from
power stations, electricity available at the well-
head went on a downward spin in terms of
quantity; electricity was supplied 24 hours/day
during the peak-monsoon and 3 hours/day in the
peak-irrigation seasons to make up the required
annual average. The flat tariff has many
advantages for TWOs but only under an
opportune electricity-supply environment in
which even if rationed, reliable power is
supplied at peak irrigation periods. What
happened in eastern UP—and indeed in all of
eastern India—during the 1980s was that
agricultural power supply got concentrated
during monsoons and, that too, during nights. In
such an inopportune power-supply
environment,
15 ETW owners began to find it
increasingly difficult to operate their tube wells
at a level of capacity utilization high enough to
cover their fixed costs that included a flat tariff
of Rs 40/hp/month.
Although published State government data
show some growth in agricultural power
connections in eastern UP during the 1980s and
the 90s, all indications from the field show that
these have actually declined rapidly. During the
late 1970s, one could find at least a dozen
ETWs in a village in the Deoria district; in the
course of my 1995 fieldwork, I had to visit a
dozen villages before we could interview the
owner of an ETW. As early as 1989, Sharma
(1989) presented a paper lamenting the
“diesalization of eastern UP’s groundwater
sector” at a workshop in Faizabad. In the
course of his 1990 survey in Faizabad and
Bahraich, Niranjan Pant’s stratified random
sample of 50 TWOs in Faizabad (just east of
Lucknow in central UP) captured 22 ETWs; but
his sample of 70 TWOs in Bahraich (deep in
eastern UP) captured only 2 ETWs.
16 In trying
to explain why eastern UP does not use its
groundwater potential fully, Kolavalli et al. (1992)
randomly selected 193 TWOs for their survey in
the Gorakhpur, Sultanpur, Azamgarh and
Mirzapur districts of eastern UP and found only
10 ETWs to survey. For their survey of 380
farmers in five districts of Gorakhpur Mandal,
Shah et al. (1997) tried to include an equal
number of electric, diesel and treadle pump
owners, water buyers and non-irrigators;
however, they found no “pure” non-irrigators and
only 4 ETW owners in 25 villages. This trend is
not evident in SEB’s published figures on
electrified tube wells because these do not
15The term inopportune is used to contain a combination of circumstances that disable TWOs from making their tube wells economically viable.
The circumstances mainly involve inadequate power supply, its unpredictability and erratic nature, most of the power supply coming in the
nights, and most critically, and nonavailability of power for long periods (often running into several weeks) because of poor maintenance of
power distribution infrastructure.
16Pant (1992:20) notes this dichotomy in his study of Faizabad and Behraich: “In fact, in majority of the villages in Bahraich electricity was not
available for tube-well irrigation and was available only at places of worship like mosques...Low use of electricity in Bahraich compared to
Faizabad is manifested in the fact that on 31.3.86, there were 2,936 energized private tube wells in Bahraich compared to 16,600 in Faizabad…”21
deduct the disconnected tube wells, which are
treated as provisional disconnections. But in
private discussions, the SEB managers readily
conceded that 80% of the pump electrification
targets were met in western and central UP,
which have most of UP’s dark and gray areas.
In eastern UP, there are no dark blocks; in fact,
all the blocks are white; but there is little or no
power there; and the pace of electrification of
new tube wells has been very slow. In a field
trip across UP in 1996, we (Tushaar Shah,
Marcus Moench and Christina Wood) found
certain divisions to be “electrically privileged;”
this was true particularly in Meerut, Agra and
Muradabad in western UP, and Varanasi in
eastern UP, which have a significantly higher
ETW density than the rest of the UP. Even
within these districts, ETW density is probably
much higher within small pockets, especially
near towns and along roadsides, as we found in
Faizabad. Away from the towns and main roads,
ETW density rapidly declines even in these
electrically privileged districts.
Officially, the SEB has spun an unbelievable
story that goes against commonsense as well
as the ground reality of eastern UP. According to
the SEB values, since 1972–73, the number of
private ETWs in UP has increased from 183,000
to over 700,000 in 1993–94 at a compound rate
of around 10%/yr. The power supplied to these
has increased at an even faster pace than their
number, from 794 million units/yr. in 1972–73 to
9,500 million units in 1994–95, at a compound
growth rate of 11.9%/yr. As a result, the average
power consumption per ETW has gone up by
over three times, from 4,072 units/yr. in
1972–73 to 11,800 units in 1994–95. The official
SEB estimate of its losses from agricultural
power supply shot up from Rs 1,630 million in
1993–94 to just under Rs 13,000 million in
1994–95. For every hour of pumping of an ETW,
the SEB has been losing over Rs 6.
17 To break
even on agricultural operations, the flat tariff
would have to be raised from the present Rs
50/hp/month to Rs 209/hp/month. The story has
been uncritically accepted by many. For
instance, a report by Tata Energy Research
Institute noted: “Because of the low agricultural
tariff and high magnitude of consumption of this
sector, the SEB loses heavily in terms of
revenue from agricultural power sales...” (TERI
1996:73). Several studies of the World Bank
have come to similar conclusions.
But several inconvenient facts remain
unexplained. First, why should farmers reject
ETWs as resoundingly as they have done in
eastern UP had power supply been so heavily
subsidized in real terms? Second, the estimates
made by field researchers of the hours of
pumpage by ETWs imply a level of actual
power consumption, which is a small fraction of
the average claimed by the SEB. Third,
accepting the SEB’s estimates raises important
questions about what 2.2 million diesel pumps
are doing in UP’s countryside and why diesel
tube wells are growing at such a phenomenal
rate.
18 Finally, much evidence suggests that, if
anything, rural power subsidies are concentrated
in electrically privileged areas of western UP; in
eastern UP, far from being subsidized, electric
power is, in effect, heavily taxed.
Consider the following. At the SEB’s value
of 11,800 kWh as the average power
consumption per ETW/yr., and assuming the
connected load to be 6-hp on average, the
average private ETW should be operating over
17The average revenue assessed was Rs 0.43 per unit supplied in 1994–95; the average cost was Rs 1.80 and the loss per unit, Rs 1.37.
According to a recent study (Tyagi 1995), the average ETW in UP is of 6.25-hp, consuming (at 0.725 units/hour) 4.53 units causing a loss of
Rs 6.20 to the SEB.
18Over the 1968–69/93–94 period, diesel pumps increased twice as fast as ETWs; the former have increased from 85,000 to 2,051,000 by
24 times, whereas the latter have gone up from 56,000 to 690,000, by 12 times (Tyagi 1995).22
2,500 h/yr. But except in small pockets of
electrically privileged districts of western UP
where studies show an average of 1,300–1,500
hours of annual operation, nowhere do ETWs in
eastern UP—nay, eastern India—operate for
more than 600–700 h/yr. The Faizabad sample
of 18 ETW owners in Pant’s 1992 study
reported an average operation of 665 h/yr. In
Shankar’s study (1992:58) of a sample of
140 households in Allahabad, ETW owners
reported the average operation to be 663 h/yr. A
survey of 478 TWOs from Muradabad,
Barabanki and Agra districts by the Operations
Research Group in 1990 indicated that 70% of
the sampled ETWs operated for less than
500 h/yr.; only 8% operated for more than
1,000 h/yr. Far from 11,800 kWh, on average,
ETWs consumed 1,870 kWh/yr. in their
Muradabad sample, 924 kWh/yr. in the
Barabanki sample and 1,990 kWh in their Agra
sample (ORG 1991:23). The average cost of
power to these was thus Rs 2.89/kWh, far more
than any other user category of the SEB. A
1981-survey by NABARD (1988) in Allahabad
district in eastern UP showed that ETW owners
operated their tube wells for an average of
636 hours and the average electricity cost/hour
to them was Rs 0.77/kWh when the SEB
claimed it realized only Rs 0.18/kWh from
agricultural consumers (UP SEB 1996: 97). But
in a similar evaluation in the electrically
privileged Muzaffarnagar district in Meerut
division, a sample of 42 ETWs operated, on an
average, for 1,034 hours at Rs 0.36/unit
(NABARD 1987). Tyagi (1995) found the
average power consumption by a sample of
229 ETWs from all over UP at 2,566 kWh/yr.,
less than 25% of the SEB estimate of
11,800 kWh/yr. At a flat tariff of Rs 50/hp/
month, the average electricity cost is thus
Rs 1.43/kWh, over 3.5 times the rate of
Rs 0.43/kWH that the SEB claimed. Tyagi
showed that for the bottom 10% of tube wells in
the sample that operated for an average of
280 h/yr., the effective power cost rises to
Rs 2.87/unit or Rs 13.08/hour. In the electrically
privileged Kanpur district of western UP, where
because of a more opportune power-supply
environment, an average tube well operated for
774 h/yr., the cost declined sharply to 1.04/kWh
or Rs 4.74/hour of operation. With this
economics, it is not surprising that farmers in
eastern UP switched to diesel engines en
masse. A 6.5-hp diesel pump would cost Rs
9.50–10/hour in fuel in 1997; thus an ETW
operating over 750 h/yr. is half as cheap to run
as a diesel pump; but one operating at less
than 300 h/yr. costs much higher to run. In the
early 1990s, this made electricity sold to
eastern UP’s agriculture amongst the most
expensive of all consumer categories: domestic
users paid Rs 0.77/kWH; commercial users
paid Rs 1.16/kWh; industries paid Rs 1.36/kWH;
and eastern UP’s agriculture paid an effective
price of Rs 1.43/kWH.
Dieselization of Eastern UP￿s Groundwater Irrigation
Until this stage, there are strong parallels
between the pattern of evolution of groundwater
development in eastern UP and the rest of
eastern India, in particular, in north Bihar, north
Bengal and coastal Orissa, which combine
large volumes of undeveloped groundwater
potential with a massive concentration of rural
poverty. If UP tried a PTW program, so did
west Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. If UP’s PTWs
failed in their promise to the poor, they failed23
even more resoundingly in Bihar and Orissa.
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The rest of the east Indian States mounted
their rural electrification programs much the
same way as UP did, but with a lag of 3–5
years. Except in southwest Bengal, elsewhere
in eastern India too, private electrified tube
wells grew in numbers—though not as rapidly
as in UP—especially in western UP. UP
changed from a metered to a flat tariff in 1975;
Bihar and Orissa followed suit. Finally, as in
eastern UP, a few years after the flat tariff was
introduced, the power-supply environment
throughout the eastern region began to
deteriorate. Within each State, there were
“electrically privileged” areas where the rural-
electricity infrastructure remained relatively
better maintained and the power-supply
environment remained in a reasonably good
condition. In west Bengal, southern districts
had a better power-supply environment and
developed dynamic agrarian economies; north
Bengal, with a poor power-supply environment
failed to develop its extraordinary groundwater
potential and stagnated. Bihar remained
electrically underprivileged throughout; yet,
the central region became less electrically
underprivileged than north Bihar with its
massive underdeveloped groundwater
resources. The Orissa, Puri and Cuttak districts
became electrically privileged; western Orissa
ended up with a poor power-supply environment.
In most respects, then, eastern UP became the
forerunner of eastern India.
But the parallels end here. With the decline
in the power-supply environment, the
development of groundwater irrigation in much
of eastern India has all but stagnated. But in
eastern UP, tube-well irrigation continued to be
a boom sector. Eastern UP dealt with the crisis
of deteriorating power supply by dieselizing its
groundwater irrigation. Here, the number of
private diesel pumps increased faster than the
decline of the electric pumps. Some evidence of
this trend is available in data collected at
district level; however, these too only add new
ETWs connected every year without deducting
the number of those that are disconnected.
Even so, as figure 11 shows, the pace of
dieselization of eastern UP’s groundwater
irrigation sector is unmistakable. Equally
unmistakable is the fact that the inopportune
power-supply environment has been behind
the strong preference for diesel pumps. A
report by the Indo-Dutch UP Tube-Well Project
MAC-IDTP (1989), citing Draft Annual Plan
1988–89, Volume I, of the Government of UP
stated:
“The overall shortfall in realization of the
Seventh Plan target of energization of
private electrical tube wells is mainly due to
cultivators’ preference for diesel-driven sets.
This preference derives from erratic and
inadequate power supply in most areas and
lower initial cost to cultivators for diesel
sets.”
20
19Though west Bengal designed a moderately successful program of turnover of small-scale government irrigation schemes—including tube
wells and river lift irrigation schemes—to beneficiary groups, in Orissa, the Lift Irrigation Corporation, which established and managed PTWs and
river lift irrigation schemes, piled up huge losses and was obliged to design a turnover program that has not been as successful as west Bengal’s
program, especially that in southwest  Bengal.
20The report further stated: “Public tube wells and private tube wells have to compete for relatively scarce power supply. Public tube wells
constructed under the World Bank Program are connected with dedicated feeder lines while private tube wells are connected with rural feeder
lines. If dedicated feeders are given priority, less electricity is available for the rural feeder lines. Shortages will become more severe and the
competition for electricity will increase” (ibid.).24
There are many problems with the
dieselization of groundwater irrigation. Diesel is
a costlier energy source compared to electricity,
in private as well as social terms, especially in
eastern India, which produces more than half of
its power from hydroelectric sources. Electricity
is also cleaner compared to diesel. Electric
pumps are easier and cheaper to maintain
compared to diesel pumps that suffer heavy
wear and tear. Finally, as we saw, diesel pumps
produce a monopolistic pump-irrigation market
that transfers wealth from resource-poor water
FIGURE 11.
Growth of electric and diesel tube wells in Gorakhpur, Maharajgunj and Deoria-Padrona districts, eastern UP.
buyers to pump owners, and forces the buyers
to economize on the use of water whose
marginal social value, in the east Indian context,
is negative. Despite all these, it would be
appropriate to say that nothing else has produced
as much welfare for the small and marginal
farmers of eastern UP as diesel-pump- driven
shallow tube wells. The central issue of interest
is why the rest of eastern India was unable to
dieselize its groundwater irrigation as rapidly as
eastern UP did during the 1985–95 period.
The Diesel Pump Dealer Dynamic
The inopportune power-supply environment was
certainly a key reason behind the rapid
increase in the number of diesel pumps in
eastern UP during the 1980s. However, an
equally important reason was the great success
that the people of eastern UP made of another
of the State government interventions to
stimulate groundwater development. Around
1975, when the Government of UP decided to
switch to a flat electricity tariff, the Reserve
Bank of India, concerned about eastern India’s
failure to take off agriculturally, appointed a25
high-powered committee to explore the issue.
This committee bemoaned the slow pace of
groundwater development as the primary cause,
and recommended a liberal subsidy to stimulate
private groundwater development. Following this,
the Government of UP launched a poverty-
targeted FBS under which the Minor Irrigation
Department was to undertake the preparation of
bore-wells (shallow tube wells) free of cost for
small and marginal farmers; additionally, varying
levels of subsidy were offered on diesel pumps
to small and marginal farmers, matching the
degree of their social and economic
backwardness. The banks also chipped in with
a loan to cover the down payment required from
the farmer under a special refinancing
arrangement from the National Bank for
Agriculture and Rural Development. Bihar, west
Bengal, Assam and Orissa followed suit with
their own variants of pump-subsidy schemes.
Soon enough, the Government of India also
launched the “Million Well Scheme” with
precisely the same objective, and targeting
socially and economically backward farmers.
Until the mid-80s, however, all these well-
intentioned minor irrigation subsidy schemes
had produced little minor irrigation in the most
groundwater-rich parts of eastern India. When
electric pumps dominated groundwater irrigation,
the real barrier that kept the poorest from laying
their hands on a pump was not the cost of the
pump but the transaction costs, delays and the
hassle of getting an electricity connection. ETW
ownership during the 1970s was therefore highly
scale-biased compared to the ownership of
diesel pump sets during the 1980s and 90s. So,
although the subsidy schemes covered electric
as well as diesel pumps, the funds allocated to
them remained grossly underutilized. Now that
ETWs were being decommissioned in large
numbers, farmers began to turn to diesel
pumps, but they—particularly, small farmers
from backward communities—found the hassle
and “transaction costs” involved in accessing
the FBS prohibitive and intimidating. A study in
1984 by the Delhi-based Society for Prevention
of Wastelands Development concluded that even
if all the paperwork of a small farmer were
perfect, the decision on his application under
the FBS took 11 months and scores of visits to
the various offices involved: the Block
Development Office, Minor Irrigation
Department, bank offices and the District Rural
Development Agency. Another set of rounds
would begin once his application was approved,
to get GI pipes and valves issued from the
Minor Irrigation Department, diesel pumps
issued from the stipulated dealers, and the bank
loan released from the Lead Bank designated
for each district. Several other restrictions were
in force: for example, only members of the field
staff of the Minor Irrigation Department were
allowed to make the bore using the
department’s rig; only one or two predesignated
brands of diesel pumps were available to the
farmer. Moreover, the farmer was obliged to
offer “speed money” at every office, which
meant that by the time the tube well was
commissioned, 35–40% of the subsidy had gone
as “speed money.”
This is still the situation in north Bengal,
Orissa and, to a lesser extent, in north Bihar.
Eastern UP however managed to break free and
transformed the diesel-pump subsidy scheme
into a powerful instrument of smallholder
irrigation. During the mid-1980s, a series of
changes occurred in the design and
implementation of the FBS, which pitchforked
the private dealer of diesel pumps to the role of
the central coordinating mechanism for the
scheme. These changes sharply reduced the
transaction costs that small farmers faced in
accessing the subsidy and loan scheme. The
diesel-pump dealer became the one-stop-shop
for farmers wanting to set up a tube well under
the FBS. In the course of unstructured
interviews with nearly 200 small farmers in the
Gorakhpur, Maharajganj and Deoria districts of
eastern UP, we found that the presence of the
diesel-pump dealer was one of the best things26
to happen to the small farmers in the region;
and that this dealer had been instrumental in
transforming the much-berated FBS into a
powerful intervention in groundwater
development. All that an eligible small farmer
has to do now is to provide his photograph and
land documents to the dealer of the brand of
diesel pump he prefers; the dealer then takes
over and completes the entire process of getting
approvals and clearances from the government
departments involved and the bank. The pump
and GI pipes are issued to the farmer on the
same day; he is free to hire local rig operators
to get his boring done, and inside of a week of
applying, his tube well is commissioned. By
then, the dealer has got all the formalities
cleared and the transaction is completed.
Scores of farmers we interviewed did agree that
the cost of the pump without the subsidy would
be lower by 8–10% but considered this a small
sewa-shulk (service fee)
21 for the red carpet the
dealer rolled out for them. By a rough estimate,
over 800,000 small diesel-pump-operated tube
wells have been installed in eastern UP under
the FBS after 1985, which probably irrigate a
gross area of 2.4–3.2 million ha of their owners’
and water buyers’ lands besides providing some
much-needed vertical drainage to the region. By
any reckoning, this rapid increase in the diesel-
pump density is at the heart of eastern UP’s
belated Green Revolution, which has still proved
elusive to other flood-prone areas of eastern
India such as north Bengal, coastal Orissa and
north and central Bihar.
What changes brought into play this virtuous
“dealer dynamic” are neither clear nor fully
explored. But from our discussions with pump
dealers and “beneficiaries” throughout the
region, the main procedural changes were:
a) the requirement that only Minor Irrigation
Department staff make free bores was given up,
and farmers were allowed to get their bores
done by numerous private rigging contractors
who did the job quicker, cheaper and better;
b) the insistence on the Minor Irrigation
Department holding the stocks of one or two
brands of pumps was abandoned; and the
farmer was allowed to choose the brand he
preferred; c) through another procedural
modification, it was now possible for the banks
to directly pay to the dealer for the diesel pump;
the subsidy was adjusted in the farmer’s
account while the balance, treated as a loan, is
to be repaid by the farmer in installments over
3 or 5 years.
There is indicative evidence to suggest that
these changes came about gradually in
response to “pulls” from the dealer community
to simplify the procedures for accessing the
FBS. As the de-electrification of rural eastern
UP gathered momentum, the demand for diesel
pumps grew. The diesel-pump dealers saw a
great business opportunity in the decline of
ETWs; and each district and tehsil town of
eastern UP saw the rise of an uncommonly
large community (20–60) of diesel-pump dealers
competing fiercely amongst themselves for
increasing their market share in the growing
market for diesel pumps. As the business grew,
besides the brand-image and the dealer-image,
the Unique Selling Proposition each dealer
began to offer to his customers was the ease
and speed of getting the FBS formalities
completed at a low sewa-shulk. Large dealers
21A good estimate of the service charge is provided by the “discount” of Rs 700–1,800 that the off-the-shelf buyer gets compared to a farmer
applying for the loan-subsidy scheme. This “discount” on direct purchase without subsidy includes a) the unofficial payments (bribes)—that
pump dealers have to pay in agencies authorized to approve the loan and subsidy; b) other money and time costs—mostly of running around
from office to office—involved in getting the application processed; c) interest costs incurred during the processing time—between the date of the
farmer’s first approach with photo and land records when he collects his engine and pump, and the date when the check gets released. The
discount varies over a long interval because large dealers, who get applications processed in fair-sized lots, are able to carry out these tasks at
a lower average cost compared to small dealers who get applications processed in ones and twos; and because of intense competition, rather
than using their lower cost to increase monopoly profits, large dealers demand a lower “service charge” to attract customers and increase their
market share.27
with reputed brands of pumps had a head start
over smaller ones and some of these sold
3,000–4,000 pumps/yr., and could, therefore,
develop a different system of offering “rents” to
various agencies involved in processing FBS
applications; they often paid monthly
installments rather than a “piece rate” that
smaller dealers paid on a case-by-case basis;
moreover, many large dealers began to keep a
special team of staff whose sole job was to
take a bunch of “subsidy files” every morning
from office to office and get them cleared by
the evening. Many of these large dealers thus
were able to offer farmers highly rated brands
of pumps under FBS for as little as 5% of the
subsidy as a sewa-shulk. Smaller dealers are
not as “efficient” as larger ones in cutting the
transaction costs of FBS access but are
restrained from levying a high sewa-shulk
because of the price leadership role of large
dealers in setting a reference service charge. It
also seems that dealers, whom pump
manufacturers offer pretty high retail margins
varying from 18% to 30% of the sale price, gun
for maximizing their sales and market share
rather than taking a cut from the “service
charge,” which therefore has little or no “rent”
extracted by the dealers.
How do we know that this so-called “dealer
dynamic” has helped stimulate eastern UP’s
groundwater development? There is no direct
macro-level evidence; the 1992 minor irrigation
census, when it becomes available, will provide
some direct district-wise data, which in
comparison with the 1987 census data will
provide a clearer picture. However, all field
studies on well irrigation suggest that a large
majority of private pumps are diesel pumps, they
are owned by small and marginal farmers, they
were acquired under the pump-subsidy scheme
and, above all, they were installed in the late
1980s or early 1990s. Another indicative evidence
is provided by the data on the offtake of
institutional credit for minor irrigation (primarily,
pumps and tube wells). Figure 12 shows the
State-wise refinance provided for minor irrigation
FIGURE 12.
Growth of NABARD refinance for tube-well construction in Indian Sates: 1982–83/1996–97.28
by the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural
Development, which is a very good proxy for
the offtake of pumps under the loan-subsidy
scheme. Clearly, it shows that while the rest of
eastern India has been lukewarm in using
NABARD’s refinance facility, UP has beaten
even States like Andhra Pradesh and
Maharashtra where private smallholder irrigation
has always been a strong sector.
This transformation of the FBS into an
instrument of expanding small-farmer ownership
of diesel pumps and bore-wells has powerful
and far-reaching ramifications. On the downside,
the pump dealer has been widely discredited as
the shady operator on the scene precisely
because he is at the center stage of the entire
scheme and lay-observers see him as the
recipient of the bribe that is the sewa-shulk;
even some pump manufacturers we interviewed
considered them with disdain in the wheeler-
dealer class; it is also likely that the reformed
FBS is a trifle more prone to mis-targeting.
However, the vastly beneficial overall impacts of
the FBS under “dealer dynamic” have been
commonly overlooked: for one, it has expanded
eastern UP’s pump density (measured as the
number of 5-hp pumps per 100 ha of farmlands)
22Northern region: Haryana, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir and Rajasthan; east and northeastern: Bihar, Orissa, west Bengal,
Sikkim, Assam, Manipur and other northeastern States; western: Maharashtra, Gujarat and Goa; southern: Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala
and Tamilnadu; central: Madhya Pradesh and UP. It must be noted that eastern UP’s 16 districts, which are an important part of eastern India are
included in central India along with the rest of UP; this means that eastern India’s poverty as well as groundwater resources are understated in
these charts.
from less than 10 in the mid-1970s to 40–50 in
the early 1990s; despite room for mis-targeting,
FBS has probably single-handedly done far
more to put a pump in the hands of the poor
than any other policy initiative ever. The
increased intensity of competition among
pump-irrigation sellers and its beneficial results
further leverage the overall impact of high
pump density for ultra-poor water buyers.
Above all else, the increased diesel-pump
density has greatly moderated the disastrous
impact of the rural de-electrification of eastern
UP; its role in ushering in eastern UP’s
ongoing agrarian transformation becomes all
too clear when one compares today’s eastern
UP with regions like north Bengal, which have
little rural electrification and where the diesel-
pump subsidy scheme works pretty much like
the way it did in eastern UP in the early
1980s. Eastern UP is already catching up with
western UP, Punjab and Haryana, in terms of
its agricultural productivity, land-use intensity
and other parameters of agrarian growth; but
the rest of eastern India, barring small
pockets, is still stagnating in traditional
technologies and methods, at least 20 years
behind eastern UP.
Lessons for Eastern India
Eastern UP, a microcosm of eastern India and
the GMB basin, has also served as the latter’s
leader and pathfinder. Our chief argument in this
report is that there have been striking parallels
between eastern UP and the rest of eastern
Indian States in the public policies pursued to
stimulate groundwater development and how
they have failed to achieve their objectives. To
be sure, the gulf between eastern and western
UP is analogous to the gulf between eastern
India and the rest of India. In illustrating this
gulf, we have derived figure 13 based on
NABARD (1995);
22 and from the analysis by
Fan, Hazell and Thorat (1998) presented in29
table 3. Figure 13 shows that eastern India
contains over a fifth of India’s blocks but it is
home to nearly 88 million, or a third of India’s
rural poor. One department in which the eastern
region has a great scope for poverty-focused
development is groundwater; it has 25% of
India’s usable groundwater resources; and less
than 20% of it is developed. And as we
reviewed earlier, developing this resource further
can not only create livelihoods and agricultural
growth but also alleviate the chronic problems
of waterlogging and flood-proneness that have
bewitched the region. That there need be no
worries on account of overexploitation of
groundwater in the eastern region is also
suggested by figure 12, which shows that only 4
of India’s 600 “dark” blocks are in the eastern
region.
Eastern UP’s experience provides us many
lessons for jump-starting eastern India’s
groundwater economy; but the most important is
that public policies and programs—such as the
public and community tube-well programs and
rural electrification program—have not worked
as planned. Based on our analysis, a strategy
of stimulating poverty-focused groundwater
development in eastern India needs to have at
least five elements:
· first, eastern India needs to seriously
reconsider its existing minor irrigation
programs run by government bureaucracies,
which gobble up funds but deliver little
minor irrigation;
· second, while the electricity-supply
environment is in total disarray, innovative
ideas need to be piloted to test alternative
approaches to efficient metering and
FIGURE 13.
Distribution of blocks, dark blocks, rural poor, groundwater resource and NABARD refinance for minor irrigation across five
regions of India.30
collection of electricity dues from millions of
small users;
· third, programs are needed to improve the
efficiency of electric as well as diesel
pumps;
· fourth, there is a need to promote smaller
than 5-hp diesel pumps and improved
manual irrigation technologies;
· finally, above all else, east Indian States
need to reform their pump subsidy schemes
in the style that UP has done so as to
ameliorate the pump-capital scarcity, which
lies at the heart of the problem. We deal
with each of these at some depth in
concluding this essay.
Public and Community Ownership and
Management
With the plethora of studies and evaluations that
testify to the resounding failure of PTW
programs in eastern UP and elsewhere in India,
TABLE 3.
Eastern India versus the rest of India.
Region # of rural # of Usable # of dark Refinance for
poor blocks recharge (km sq) blocks tube wells (Rs million)
North 27,154 654 34.93 189 13,939
Central 75,030 1,354 103.3 115 24,979
West 38,094 1,698 38.6 81 19,345
South 49,470 1,814 65.5 210 26,657
East 88,429 1,543 82.57 4 6,810
Northeast India 278,177 7,063 324.9 599 91,730
Source: NABARD 1995; Fan, Hazzel and Thorat 1998.
cessation of support to such programs should
be a forgone conclusion; however, this is far
from the case. In many States, new programs—
mostly donor-supported—are afoot to make new
investments in group-owned and -managed
minor irrigation assets, or to rehabilitate past
investments. This steadfast devotion of donors
and governments to the notion that the poor can
access benefits of groundwater irrigation only
through government- or community-managed
tube wells seems particularly unfounded in
eastern India where the conditions are best
suited for small-scale owner-managed tube
wells. In eastern UP, at least, the PTW program
tried to harness scalar economies and new
technologies—such as deep tube wells, piped
distribution and dedicated power supply—to
cover 100 ha or more of design command under
each tube well. But in many other east Indian
States, government departments are building
small tube wells of the type that private farmers
have and operate these through a bureaucracy
at levels, which do not even cover their
operators’ salary.  At the end of a spell of
fieldwork in Puri district of Orissa, I found:
“Of the 99 Lift Irrigation (LI) schemes that
Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation’s (OLIC)
Pipli office is responsible for in these three
blocks, 61 were functional; last year31
(1997–98), according to OLIC records these
irrigated 1,113 acres (average command
area/LI is 18.2 acres) and collected an
irrigation fee of Rs 216,600 (average fee
collection/LI is Rs 3,550; average fee/acre
is Rs 194.60). The economics of the LIs
seems designed for unviability in perpetuity.
Four new schemes were constructed in
1996–97 at a total cost of Rs 2.4 million; if
this represents the general picture, the
average 5-hp LI, which commands an
average of 6–7 acres, costs Rs 600,000
apiece or Rs 90,000+/acre or over Rs
200,000/ha of net irrigated area commanded!
Farmers build irrigation potential at 10% of
this cost. This must be among the costliest
irrigation potential created in a region, which
abounds in groundwater and surface water.
It is crazy that DRDAs and NABARD are
throwing away good money after bad, but it
is even crazier that a thoughtful donor like
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) keeps
supporting OLIC’s new LI schemes” (Shah
1998b).
Similarly, in assessing the effectiveness of
the Dutch-supported minor irrigation program in
north Bengal, I found that:
“...the critical challenge of minor irrigation
development—and, indeed, of overall
agrarian growth—in north Bengal is of
dealing with the pump capital scarcity…of
raising its pump density of around 1–3
pumps/100 ha of net sown area to 25–40.
This requires programs designed to put the
pump into the hands of the poor…north
Bengal, instead, has been busy building
minor irrigation miscellanies that gobble
funds but make little net addition to minor
irrigation. Most of India gave up building
new PTWs and big community-managed
river lift irrigation schemes 15 years ago;
but north Bengal—which does not need deep
tube wells in the first place—has continued
building them. [Then, the] use of buried
pipeline distribution systems in north
Bengal—a flat terrain with the marginal
value of groundwater at subzero levels—
seems to be a doubtful strategy. True, large
group tube wells with buried pipelines are
doing well in north Gujarat and Maharashtra
where farmers have money and enterprise
but not groundwater. North Bengal’s farmers
have too much water but no pump capital;
collective management of lift irrigation
systems is neither necessary nor worthwhile
for them. The correct minor irrigation
strategy for Gujarat is clearly a wrong minor
irrigation strategy for north Bengal; it should
be the reverse of it” (Shah 1998a).
The first important initiative needed to
stimulate groundwater development is to
discontinue forthwith these costly programs of
building public- and community-managed deep
tube wells and large river lift irrigation schemes.
Countless examples show that these are costlier
to build and operate compared to small private
tube wells, they are extremely difficult to
manage, and use technologies for which there is
no rationale in eastern India.
Electricity Supply and Pricing
During the 1980s, I showed that, in eastern
India with abundant groundwater, a reasonably
high flat electricity tariff, accompanied by a
carefully rationed agricultural power supply, can
be a powerful way of transforming groundwater
markets into an effective instrument of small
farmer development without subsidizing
electricity (Chambers et al. 1987; Shah 1993).
The argument had several propositions: a) a flat
tariff reduces the real cost of supplying power
to farmers by saving substantial costs of
metering and revenue collection; b) it curtails32
the powerful incentive to pilfer under the
metered tariff scheme; c) it forces ETW owners
to sell more water by charging lower prices to
buyers who are mostly the resource-poor;
d) where diesel-pump owners compete with
ETW owners in local water markets, the latter
exercise a disciplining influence on the former
and oblige them to sell water at a price lower
than what they would have set; e) the Electricity
Board can counter the propensity of ETW
owners to expand their use of power under the
flat tariff scheme either by raising the flat tariff
to cover the average full cost and/or by carefully
rationing high-quality power supply to agriculture.
The veracity of these propositions has been
proven by the experience of many Indian
States, including eastern UP where, even today,
ETW owners who remain sell water at a much
lower price than that charged by diesel-pump
owners and are a disciplining influence on local
water markets. Many States have raised their
flat tariff to reasonable levels. Haryana has
raised its flat tariff to Rs 65/hp/month—at which
its electricity subsidies have been maintained at
manageable levels. Gujarat has a progressive
flat tariff of Rs 195/hp/yr. for smaller than
7.5-hp tube wells going up to Rs 360/hp/yr. for
tube wells bigger than 15-hp. However, this
analysis presupposed fine-tuned management of
electricity supply and pricing policies that
eastern State governments and electricity
boards have proven unequal to. As a result, the
flat tariff has produced nearly opposite results in
eastern India—of its rapid rural de-
electrification. However, the critical role of rural
electrification in eastern India’s agricultural
economy needs to be recognized. For one, in
real terms, electricity is cheaper than diesel.
Second, it is cleaner. Third, since over half of
eastern UP’s electricity is generated from
hydroelectric projects, it makes good sense to
promote its use for the region’s agricultural
development. Finally, as we reviewed earlier,
east Indian agriculture, in effect, suffers from
negative electricity subsidies; and if Central and
State governments are willing to commit
substantial public funds to subsidize canal
irrigation and PTW programs, there is a strong
case for removing the effective tax on
agricultural power consumption by creating an
opportune power-supply environment in the
region.
No matter how urgent the need for
improving eastern India’s power-supply
environment, may be for the region’s agricultural
development, it is unlikely that such
improvement and the investments needed for
them will come about without exploring radically
new ways of pricing rural power supply,
especially because dieselization of pump
irrigation has provided an effective “safety
valve” that will reduce the intensity of popular
discontent. The existing literature offers no
insights into how best to do this. The central
issue is of reducing the SEB’s metering and
collection costs by drastically reducing the
number of power-supply points that the SEB
directly monitors. One idea worth experimenting
is some variation of electricity cooperatives that
became hugely successful in rural US in the
early decades of the last century and that has
also worked in Maharashtra and Andhra
Pradesh though not very successfully. Basically,
the Indian electricity cooperatives have been
doing power distribution; they buy power in bulk
and distribute it to their members; the Electricity
Board finds it useful because they are in a
better position to contain pilferage and collect
electricity bills at lower costs. An alternative
that uses the same principle is to invite Gram
Panchayats (Village Councils) to undertake the
distribution of power within the village and
collect electricity dues. In such an arrangement,
the SEB can maintain one central meter for the
village as a whole and charge the Panchayat
based on metered consumption by the village.
The Panchayat can then monitor power
consumption by both domestic and agricultural33
consumers and recover electricity dues from
them. The arrangement can be attractive if the
SEB can pass on to the Panchayats its own
metering and collection costs, which are huge
and were estimated to be nearly 45–50% of the
actual cost of agricultural power supply. Efficient
Panchayats can then transform electricity
retailing into an income-generating proposition.
An inferior alternative is to try private power-
distribution contractors who will be charged on
consumption recorded in a central SEB meter
and who, in turn, retail power to individual users.
An important technological device that can
make such decentralized retailing of electricity
is the prepaid electricity cards that, for
example, have been vigorously promoted by
Eskom, the South African electricity utility to
small, dispersed consumers. Eskom discovered
the usefulness of the prepaid cards in meeting
precisely the same challenge that Indian SEBs
are facing, viz., of charging for power based on
use by large numbers of tiny users scattered
over a vast area.  For the power supplier, this
technology drastically reduces the cost of
metering and charge-collection; for the users, it
offers a transparent device to plan and monitor
their electricity consumption. The prepaid card
technology may be expensive for low volumes;
but for the kind of large volumes that rural
power consumers in India offer, the cost of the
technology can be very affordable; and large-
scale user acceptance can be ensured if the
SEBs transfer part of the savings to users while
improving the quality of power supply to
adopters. Finally, when combined with prepaid
cards, decentralized retailing and charging for
power become a distinctly more feasible
proposition.
Energy Efficiency
A critical issue in eastern India’s groundwater
irrigation is energy use in pumping and the
measures to improve it; while its efficiency
dimensions are well documented its equity
dimensions are not. The subject has been
studied since the early 1970s and a general
empirical conclusion is that 30–35% of the
energy actually used by irrigation pump sets
can be saved through “rectification” of pump
sets. It is suggested that against the maximum
achievable “system efficiency” of 54% for
electric pump sets and 20% for diesel pump
sets, observed efficiencies are sometimes as
low as 13% and 5%, respectively. Reasons?
The subsidized flat electricity tariff and the
ignorance of farmers about selection, operation
and upkeep of the pump. S. M. Patel, an
agricultural engineer based in Ahmedabad who
pioneered thousands of pump rectification
experiments throughout India, has asserted that
replacing only the foot-valve and suction pipe
increases the water output of diesel pumps by
30%. But as table 4 shows full-scale
rectification—involving appropriately matched
foot-valve, suction pipe, delivery pipe, pump and
engine—can increase the discharge of a diesel
pump by 85% and cut diesel consumption/hour
by 17% (Patel and Pandey 1989; Reidhead 1999).
Independently of S. M. Patel’s work, some
Dutch-supported shallow tube-well projects using
diesel engines in north Bengal also found
energy efficiency of these pumping systems
unacceptably low. Experiments on pump
TABLE 4
Impact of modifications on fuel efficiency of diesel pumps:
Test results in north Bengal Terai Development Project (static
suction head in shallow tube wells: 3.5 m).
Modification Discharge Diesel Cumulative
(l/s) consumption Improvement
(l/h) (%)
Unmodified 8.6 0.8 -
Raising cooling water
temp. from 35 0C to 75 0C 8.6 0.78 13
Removing check valve 10.5 0.76 31
Reducing engine speed
from 1,470 to 1,100 rpm 10.3 0.55 51
Source: NBTDP 1996:434
rectification here showed that fuel efficiency can
be improved significantly by removing the
restrictor,
23 by attaching a thermo-syphon
cooling system,
24 by reducing the engine
speed,
25 and by removing the check-valve (or
foot-valve in case of dug-wells) (NBTDP 1996;
Bom and van Steenbergen nd). Tests on
modified pumps showed that diesel consumption
can be cut to half and discharge improved over
15% through rectification as shown in table 5.
While the full rectification program recommended
by S. M. Patel may cost nearly Rs 8,000 for
diesel pumps (Reidhead 1999), the modifications
piloted in the north Bengal project may cost Rs
350 (Bom and van Steenbergen nd).
Following the pioneering work by S. M. Patel
and his colleagues, many State electricity
boards, Rural Electrification Corporations and
NGOs like the Tata Energy Research Institute
have promoted programs for pump rectification.
The results have been mixed; and an important
reason is that farmers are unable to meet the
exacting conditions of maintenance, repair and
spare-parts that high-fuel efficiency demands
(Reidhead 1999). Nevertheless, the reasons for
persisting with the pump-rectification programs
are compelling. Existing programs are driven
primarily by the energy efficiency goal and
secondarily by the pollution-control goal.
Reidhead (1999) estimates that rectification of
all 5.4 million diesel pump sets in India can
save 1 billion liters of diesel every year, or an
annual economic gain of Rs 28 billion for a
capital investment of Rs 48 billion. But an
important additional reason, at least to push the
diesel-pump rectification program, is equity. We
examined the conceptual and empirical basis of
the argument that asserts the price at which
diesel pump owners sell water to resource-poor
water buyers is linked directly with the cost of
diesel consumed per hour by a multiple that
tends to be “sticky.” Because the sale of pump
irrigation is transacted on the basis of hours of
pumping rather than on the quantity of water,
the cost of inefficiency of the pumps gets
transferred to water buyers in two ways: for the
same price/hour, buyers get less water than
they would get from a rectified pump; second,
rectified pump owners would be able to charge
a lower price as a competitive strategy because
they use less diesel per hour of operation. It is
highly plausible then that a group of rectified
diesel-pump owners competing with inefficient
diesel-pump owners in a village would enjoy a
powerful competitive advantage over the latter,
create welfare gains for the water buyers in
terms of doubly reduced cost per unit of water,
and generate strong incentives for the rest of
the diesel-pump owners to rectify their pump
sets. Figure 14, which explores the profit-
maximizing strategy of a water seller, suggests
that after pump rectification, which lowers his
marginal cost of water production, he would be
induced to sell a Q1 amount of water that is
more than Q0, which he sold earlier at a profit-
maximizing price P1, that is lower than P0,
 which
he charged before pump rectification.
23Pumps in north Bengal commonly use a 2-inch nozzle on a 2.5-inch delivery pipe to increase pressure for diverting the cooling water but
causing unnecessary friction.
24Because farmers cool the engine by leading water directly from the pump to the engine, the engine operates at nonoptimal cooling tempera-
tures of less than 35 
0C, much lower than the temperature at which diesel engines are designed to operate. The NBTDP experiment attached a
25-liter water drum mounted on a bracket and welded to the delivery pipe. An inlet hose at the bottom of the drum leads the water into the
engine; after circulating in the engine, the water is discharged back into the drum through an outlet at the top of the drum. The temperature of the
circulating water stabilizes at 75 
0C and is replenished every 2 hours.
25In north Bengal, as elsewhere in the Ganga basin—where suction heads range from 2 to 5 meters, a 5-hp engine proves oversized; here,
pumps use only 2.3–2.5-hp and at 1,500 rpm, engines operate at part-load and therefore at low efficiency. Decreasing the engine speed to
1,100 rpm, the lowest possible speed, the power output is reduced to 3.7-hp, which is still too much. The speed (rpm) is reduced by
counteracting the spring on the fuel pump with a rubber band.35
Manual and Small Diesel Pumps
The fourth element of the strategy for
groundwater-led rural regeneration in the Ganga
basin is the promotion of small pumps and
improved manual irrigation technologies. In
arguing for the pump-rectification programs, we
noted that the shallow tube wells and dug-wells
in the Ganga basin cannot use all the power of
a 5-hp engine because the suction head is very
low; and that, at full rpm, the pumps effectively
use just around 2–2.5-hp. The ideal solution
would be to offer 2- or 2.5-hp diesel engines in
this region; however, after 50 years of
groundwater development, the Indian diesel-
pump manufacturers have not effectively
promoted anything smaller than a 5-hp diesel
engine that might drive an irrigation pump. Even
today, only two manufacturers—Greves Cotton
and Sriram Honda offer a 1.95-hp diesel/
kerosene pump, which is popular in parts of the
Chhotanagpur plateau; but it is difficult to find
pumps of this size elsewhere in the basin. For
a long time, the industry kept arguing that the
market for small diesel pumps is very small. It
was also suggested that the 5-hp diesel engine
is versatile because it can be used to run a
thresher or a generator set. The key reason, it
seems, is that the small pumps marketed by
the Indian manufacturers do not offer a
significant price advantage compared to the 5-
hp pumps nor are they particularly fuel-efficient
in the field conditions as some of the Chinese
small pumps are proving to be in Bangladesh. If
the import of micro-diesel pumps had been
allowed, small farmers, especially in the Indian
side of the Ganga basin, would probably have
taken to them in large numbers, as Bangladesh
farmers have taken to Chinese micro-diesel
pumps.
The availability of diesel pumps in a range
of hp ratings would expand the choices
available to the farmers to adopt a pump that
fits his farm size. It would also help refine the
pump-irrigation market; smaller pumps would
be able to sell at a lower price because they
are more fuel-efficient; this would also
influence the competition within local water
markets. Smaller pumps will also promote
energy efficiency. Finally, since smaller pumps
FIGURE 14.
Impact of pump rectification on the economics of a water seller.36
will also be correspondingly cheaper to acquire
as well as to operate, they will be more
appropriate and accessible to small and
marginal farmers.
Indeed, the thumping response that
improved manual technologies—such as treadle
pumps—have received in Bangladesh and also
in eastern India underscores the point that
small farmers’ capital investment decisions are
highly price-sensitive. The hallmark of the
treadle pump is that it costs in the
neighborhood of Rs 750 to buy, it does not
necessitate recurring cash outlays on diesel or
kerosene, and it can be conveniently operated
by men, women or children; and at a discharge
of 0.9–1.1 l/s, it can easily irrigate half an acre
of vegetables or even paddy. The treadle pump
is an outstanding example of how access to
groundwater irrigation can significantly improve
the livelihoods of the ultra-poor. Many studies
have tried to assess the impacts of the
technology; the most recent one (Shah et al.
2000:1) concluded that:
“a) the treadle pump technology does “self-
select” the poor, although the first-generation
adopters tend to be the less poor; b) it
transforms smallholder farming systems in
different ways in different subregions; in
north Bengal and Bangladesh, adopters take
to cultivation of HYV rice in the boro
season; elsewhere, adopters turn to
vegetable cultivation and marketing; c) it
results in increased land-use intensity as
well as “priority cultivation;” adopters
provide crop-saving irrigation in a large part
of their holdings but practice highly intensive
farming in the “priority plot;” d) average crop
yields on “priority plots” tend to be much
higher than those obtained by farmers using
diesel pumps or other irrigation devices; e)
the income impact varies across households
and regions; but US$100/yr. as an average
increase in annual net income seems a
conservative estimate. Less-enterprising
adopters achieve fuller employment at an
“implicit wage rate” that is 1.5–2.5 times the
market rate. The more enterprising take to
intelligent commercial farming and earn
substantially more. For a marginal farmer
with $12–15 to spare, there could hardly be
a better investment than a treadle pump,
which has a benefit/cost ratio of 5, an IRR
of 100% and a payback period of a year. It
thus ideally fills the need of the marginal
farmers. The challenge lies in its marketing;
exceptional ingenuity seems required to put
the treadle pump in the hands of millions of
the rural poor. In Bangladesh, where this
has become possible, over a million pumps
so far sold probably do not account for a
large proportion of irrigated area but have
certainly reached a significant proportion of
Bangladesh’s rural poor.”
Reform of Pump-Subsidy Schemes
Finally, and above all, the eastern States need a
drastic reform of their pump subsidy and credit
schemes. As a region (including eastern UP)
that is home to more than a third of India’s rural
poor and that commands a third of the country’s
groundwater resources, one would have
imagined that eastern India would also get a
corresponding share in minor irrigation credit.
Yet, only 7% of NABARD’s minor irrigation
refinance—representing the total offtake of
minor irrigation credit—goes to eastern India. It
is important to recognize that this poor offtake
does not reflect the absence of need or demand
for subsidy support; nor does it reflect
NABARD’s unwillingness to push credit for tube
wells in eastern India. Above all, it reflects the
difficulty, hassle and transaction costs of37
accessing pump-subsidy and loan schemes as
they are designed and operated by State
governments. Indeed, the first-best solution is to
remove pump subsidies altogether; in our
analysis, pump prices in India would fall by 30–
40% if pump subsidies were removed and free
import of Chinese pumps was allowed. In
Pakistan, which meets both these conditions,
pump prices are 35–40% lower than in India,
where pump subsidies and import restrictions
have kept prices artificially inflated (see, e.g.,
Shah et al. 2000). However, if pump subsidies
have to be maintained, their design and
operation need to ensure smooth access and
freedom from hassle and bribes in accessing
these. This can be understood by the examples
of north Bengal (Shah 1998b), where the pump
subsidy scheme has become an instrument of
political patronage and of Orissa where it has
become a bureaucratic spoils system (Shah
1998a; 1998b).
In Coochbehar and Jalpaiguri districts of
north Bengal—which are as flush with
groundwater resources and equally bewitched by
the problem of rural poverty as eastern UP—a
scheme has existed for long to rapidly augment
private stock of pump capital; however, a recent
assessment of minor irrigation policy in north
Bengal showed that the subsidy scheme of the
latter has been systematically co-opted by the
State’s minor irrigation administration and the
Panchayati Raj institutions; and the process of
accessing the scheme has been made so
lengthy, complex and laborious that small
farmers, without backing in the political system,
have completely given up hope of ever
benefiting from it (Shah 1998a).
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The procedure for accessing the pump
subsidy in north Bengal involves the following
steps: 1) the aspirant, equipped with necessary
documentation, gets his request registered with
the Gram Panchayat; 2) once the Gram
Panchayat clears his request, a Gram
Panchayat member has to recommend his name
to the Block Development Officer; 3) the
application is discussed in periodic meetings of
the Bank, Gram Panchayat Pradhan and
Panchayat Samiti (Block Council) member
concerned to assess the creditworthiness and
eligibility of the aspirant; 4) if the aspirant
clears this stage, his application is completed
and forwarded to the bank with the
recommendation of the Panchayat Samiti;
5) after this, the bank claims the subsidy from
the DRDA; 6) the bank releases the loan but
only  after the DRDA reimburses the subsidy;
7) the bank issues the Delivery Order to the
beneficiary who can go and claim his diesel
pump. The procedure generally takes 1 year or
more; in recent times, it has seldom got completed
because banks, facing mass defaults in
government-subsidy schemes, are dragging their
feet.
27
A major deterrent is the “quota” system.
Each district, each Panchayat Samiti and each
Gram Panchayat has a quota fixed by the
government and Zilla Parishads. For a long
time, the bulk of the quota got used up by
Gram Panchayats buying subsidized diesel
pumps and stocking them ostensibly for renting
26The pump-subsidy scheme in north Bengal is run under several schemes including the IRDP by the DRDA. Under this scheme, SC/ST and
BPL families are entitled to a subsidy of Rs 6,000 on unit cost of the pump. The government departments involved in minor irrigation subsidy are
the DRDA (IRDP), the Agriculture Department and the SC-ST Corporation. The unit price for an STW has recently been raised. The subsidy is
50% or Rs 6,000 whichever is less. The bank finances the whole investment for the diesel pump, but will not give cash; instead, it will issue a
Delivery Order to the dealer; the dealer will issue the pump and the engine and will later get reimbursed by the bank.
27Banks do not proceed unless the Panchayat Samiti forwards an application; and the Panchayat Samiti does not forward it without the Gram
Panchayat’s recommendation. The Panchayat leadership thus has a tight grip over the process and uses it in a blatantly partisan manner. A
senior bank manager suggested that Panchayat members and their protégés are naturally the first to access the subsidy; and ordinary folk
cannot access it except through the goodwill of the Panchayat leadership.38
out to small and marginal farmers.
28 We found
all-round frustration with the pump-subsidy
scheme, which was matched only by their
frustration in accessing the Gram Panchayat
diesel-pumps-for-renting. Even farmers who
were Gram Panchayats or Panchayat Samiti
members thought the procedure to access the
loan-subsidy scheme to be very lengthy,
complex and tiresome; so politically
unconnected small farmers seldom tried it. A
dealer in oil engines we met in Jalpaiguri
lamented that a) the system of processing the
loan-subsidy in west Bengal is extremely
complex and takes enormous time; b) the dealer
has no role in it; he comes into the picture only
after all the loan-subsidy formalities are
completed; and c) this affects the demand for
pumps, which can be potentially large. Another
prominent and experienced diesel-pump dealer
of Coochbehar, however, went to the heart of
the problem of why the subsidy-loan scheme
here does not function quite like it does in
eastern UP. He said that the pump dealer has a
very limited marketing role in north Bengal; no
buyer approaches the dealer until his application
has been cleared at all the steps of the loan-
subsidy process; so all that the dealer can do
is to scout for farmers whose applications are
already approved and try to sell his brand to
him. The transaction cost of influencing the
Panchayat decision-making process is very
high; therefore, the diesel-pump dealer in north
Bengal has not been very aggressive.
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In Orissa whose capital is Bhubaneshwar, a
50% subsidy is available on the cost of diesel
as well as on electrified tube wells but the
entire process of subsidy approval and supply
of equipment is controlled by the Orissa Agro-
Industries Corporation (OAIC) pretty much as
the pump subsidy was administered in UP
before it was reformed in the mid-1980s but the
process is faster. The procedure here is: a) the
farmer approaches the OAIC office with a
completed form and required documentation;
b) he gets the necessary clearance from the
Agriculture Department; c) he deposits Rs 1,000
for test drilling; d) the OAIC makes an estimate
of the total cost of the tube well; e) the farmer
deposits 50% of the estimated cost with the
OAIC; f) the pump and pipe are released
immediately; and the bore-well gets commissioned
in 7–8 days by any of the approved contractors
of the OAIC. The OAIC people claimed that
there is minimum hassle and delay; although the
subsidy has to be approved by the Bhubaneshwar
office, which often takes 4–5 months, the OAIC
releases it to the farmer immediately; so the
farmer does not have to wait. Several farmers
we talked to agreed that hassle, running around
from-this-government-office-to-that and delay are
not the problems of availing of the OAIC
subsidy; the problem is that there is little or no
real subsidy left for the farmer; the bulk of it is
swiped by the OAIC in the form of inflated cost
estimates. The estimates made by the OAIC,
based on which 50% subsidy is claimed, are so
much higher than the market prices that
effectively the farmer gets very little real
subsidy. This is true about all the agro-
equipment that the OAIC supplies on a 50%
subsidy. In the course of fieldwork in the Puri
district of Orissa in 1998, I found that the
28Various arrangements have been evolved in different villages for the custody, maintenance and repair, renting-out business and fee collection
for panchayat-owned diesel pumps.  Shah (1998a) however found that Panchayat-owned diesel pumps were commonly monopolized by the
panchayat members and their kith and kin; and the marginal farmers who were really in need could seldom hire these pumps. Besides, the
arrangement is proving unviable. A major problem was of maintenance; numerous Gram Panchayats have warehouses full of broken-down
diesel engines and pumps; because they were common property, nobody paid attention to their maintenance; in many villages, we found that
users bought diesel to run the machine but avoided buying Mobil leaving it to others to lubricate it.
29Jain, a large pump dealer I interviewed in 1998, told me, however, that the pump dealer is indeed a very aggressive player in agriculturally
dynamic districts such as Burdwan and Hoogly. Perhaps, the large overall volume of business there has increased dealers’ stake in an enlarged
coordination role, and that at larger volumes, they can absorb the higher transaction costs of “managing” the Panchayat decision making in the
minor irrigation field.39
market price of the best brands of hand pumps
ranged from Rs 290 to Rs 520; one dealer
offered confidently to install any make of hand
pump successfully for Rs 1,500; but at a local
OAIC office, he was told that the unit cost of
the hand pump (only the pump) is Rs 2,776 on
which the farmer gets a subsidy of Rs 1,388,
four times the market price of a hand pump
(Shah 1998b). I also interviewed farmers who
withdrew their applications for the subsidy
scheme after they found that the cost estimates
made by the OAIC were more than twice they
would incur if they went direct to the market; in
effect, thus there was a negative subsidy. In the
case of hand pumps and diesel pumps, the
farmer always has the option to go to the
private dealers and not claim subsidy; but in the
case of treadle pumps, the OAIC is a monopoly
supplier. Manufacturers of treadle-pumps were
willing to offer treadle pumps at Rs 785 each;
but the OAIC brought the treadle pump under
their subsidy list, priced it at Rs 1,400 and
offered a subsidy of 50%. In Orissa, thus, the
process of claiming the pump subsidy is smooth
and fast, but there is effectively very little real
subsidy to the claim. No wonder, then, that
private investment in pump irrigation has not
responded to the government’s offer of the
50% subsidy.
Clearly, between them, eastern UP, north
Bengal and Orissa offer us three models of
“rent-seeking” from the monopoly that different
groups of decision makers enjoy over the power
to grant approval to loans/subsidy schemes. In
north Bengal, the monopoly is enjoyed by
members of the ruling political formation who
use it as patronage to command and strengthen
allegiance and political support; but since this
objective is not consonant with the objectives of
nationalized banks and NABARD, they have
reduced their participation. In Orissa, the
monopoly is vested in the Corporation, which
has effectively skimmed the bulk of the subsidy
by over-costing; as a result, the “demand pull”
for the loan-subsidy scheme from the farmers
itself has been weak. In eastern UP, the
absolute monopoly power itself is diffused
through the competitive dealer dynamic resulting
in a win-win situation for all: dealers interested
in increasing their sales and market share find
in the FBS a powerful instrument; banks are
happy because dealers take part-responsibility
for recovering the loans; staff in relevant
government and bank offices are happy
because their total rents are large (though the
piece rate is lower); and farmers are supremely
happy because for a small sewa-shulk dealers
roll the red carpet for them, and get their tube
wells commissioned inside of 10 days.
There is a strong case for the rest of
eastern India to redesign their pump-subsidy
scheme à la eastern UP. Probably the most
important first step to doing this is to recognize
that the primary purpose of minor irrigation
policy in east Indian States is to put the pumps
in the hands of the small and marginal farmer.
Second, the government should discontinue all
allocations to government- and community-
managed minor irrigation schemes since all
available evidence shows that these fail to
produce sustainable minor irrigation. Third,
concentrating available financial resources for
minor irrigation in the pump-subsidy scheme
should create a general sense of resource
sufficiency; similarly, NABARD too should help
create the impression that all eligible loan
applications will be processed and sanctioned.
Creating this sense of sufficiency is important in
breaking the monopoly rents that the power to
approve loan and subsidy applications creates
in bureaucracies. Fourth, the farmer should be
given freedom to choose whatever brand of
pump and engine he wants to buy; he should
also have the freedom to choose his own
contractor to make his bore-well. Fifth, the
procedures to access the pump loan/subsidy
scheme should be streamlined and rationalized
as in UP. Finally, the dealer as well as the local
administration should be vigorously involved in
the recovery of loans.40
Conclusions
It has to be concluded, then, that the story of
groundwater-based livelihood creation in eastern
India is one of failed public initiatives but one of
successful adaptive responses by private
agents. It has long been recognized that rapid
development of groundwater irrigation in this
region can create massive welfare for the poor
by energizing the region’s predominantly
agrarian economy. Yet, the public and
community tube-well program initiated by the
government and supported by many donors has,
in retrospect, been a resounding failure. The
Rural Electrification Program, hugely funded by
the World Bank, could also have stimulated
much groundwater irrigation; however, the 1980s
saw progressive “de-electrification” of eastern
India’s countryside, and a rapid decline in
electricity use in the region’s agriculture. Finally,
while the public-sector financial institutions
channelized massive resources to support
groundwater development in western and
southern India, where overexploitation of the
resources has been reaching critical
proportions, eastern India, which has much
unutilized groundwater potential, has received a
much smaller amount of institutional credit than
its fair share.
In the face of such public-policy failures, it
is not surprising that groundwater development
in the Ganga basin has been far slower than
elsewhere in the subcontinent. The redeeming
aspect has been adaptive responses of private
actors that, in eastern UP and north Bihar, have
stimulated private groundwater development and
catalyzed a belated Green Revolution. Here, the
failure of the PTW program was overshadowed
by the rise of pervasive pump-irrigation
markets; and the impact of rural “de-
electrification” was offset by the rapid
dieselization of groundwater irrigation. An
alternative to the high fuel cost of diesel-pump
irrigation too was promoted—not by the
government—but by the International
Development Enterprises, a private NGO, which
promoted treadle-pump irrigation as a
technology for the poor. Finally, a hassle-ridden
FBS was transformed into an instrument of
small farmer development by spontaneous
“dealer dynamic” in eastern UP and north Bihar.
The moral of the story is clear: tube-well-
induced agrarian dynamism that we find in
eastern UP and north Bihar in recent years can
spread to all of eastern India and Nepal terai if
public policy makers learn correct lessons from
the experience of these two subregions.
The object of this policy paper has been to
understand these lessons. Our key conclusion is
that much public policy effort aimed to stimulate
groundwater-based livelihood creation has so far
been misdirected and infructuous. In future, the
best role for public policy lies in catalyzing and
supporting private action. The strategy outlined to
do this suggests five points of attack:
· Discontinue government minor irrigation
programs; instead focus on private tube wells as
the primary mode for groundwater development.
· Improve the electricity-supply environment
for agriculture by reintroducing metered
tariff, decentralized retailing of electricity,
and the use of prepaid electricity cards.
· Initiate planned interventions to improve the
energy efficiency of agricultural pumping sets.
· Introduce small diesel pumps and manual
irrigation technologies for vegetable growers
and marginal farmers.
· Remove the pump subsidies while also
opening up the imports of Chinese pumps; if
doing this is not feasible or practical, follow
the next best alternative of redesigning the
pump-subsidy schemes à la UP’s FBS.41
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